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RESTRAINING LIVE HAND CONTROL OF INHERITANCE 
MARK GLOVER* 
ABSTRACT 
 Inheritance law generally defers to the donor’s decisions 
regarding what property should be distributed to which donees.  
Because these decisions are carried out after the donor’s death, 
the law’s deference to the donor has become known as “dead hand 
control.”  But just as the inheritance process is guided by the 
decisions of the dead, it is also influenced by the choices of the 
living.  When the donor names a donee in their estate plan, the 
donee must decide whether to accept or reject the gift.  If the donee 
accepts the gift, the property becomes theirs, but if the donee 
rejects the gift, the property is distributed to an alternate donee.  
Thus, inheritance law grants control not only to the dead hand of 
the donor but also to the live hand of the donee.  This latter 
deference to the donee has become known as “live hand control.” 
 Although the law grants the donee broad freedom to accept or 
reject inheritances, it restrains the donee’s ability to reject a gift 
under some scenarios, and it restrains their ability to accept a gift 
under others.  Legal scholars have devoted considerable attention 
to the study of each type of live hand restraint, but they typically 
have focused on one type or the other without exploring possible 
connections between the two.  To fill this analytical void, this 
Article will bring together the law’s restraints of acceptance and 
rejection and seek to develop a unifying theoretical framework that 
can guide policymakers in deciding when and how to restrain the 
donee’s discretion to accept or reject a gift. 
 Specifically, this Article will argue that the law’s live hand 
restraints, whether of rejection or acceptance, are primarily 
founded upon the concern that the donee’s decisions to accept or 
reject a gift will impose costs on others that the donee likely does 
not take into account when making their decisions.  In these 
situations, deference to the donee might not be socially beneficial, 
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and, consequently, the law restricts their decision-making ability.  
Ultimately, informed by the insights gleaned from a comparative 
analysis of the two types of live hand restraints, this Article will 
explore specific reform proposals that can increase the social 
welfare generated by the inheritance process. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Inheritance law relies upon autonomous individuals to decide how 
property should be distributed upon death.  Policymakers have neither crafted 
a mandatory estate plan that governs the disposition of every estate nor given 
probate courts the authority to question the merits of particular bequests.1  
Instead, the law generally defers to the donor’s decisions regarding what 
property should be distributed to which donees.2  By granting the donor this 
broad freedom of disposition, the law attributes considerable weight to the 
preferences of someone who is inevitably dead at the time those preferences 
are honored.3  The law’s deference to the donor’s decisions regarding the 
                                                                    
 1.  See Daniel B. Kelly, Restricting Testamentary Freedom: Ex Ante Versus Ex Post 
Justifications, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1125, 1136–37 (2013) (“[L]egislatures must rely on general 
rules governing the succession of property (e.g., the first child inherits everything or each child 
receives an equal share), which can be overinclusive, underinclusive, or both.  Typically, courts 
have neither the time nor the institutional capacity to investigate the circumstances of each decedent 
to determine the optimal distribution.”). 
 2.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 
cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (“American law does not grant courts any general authority to 
question the wisdom, fairness, or reasonableness of the donor’s decisions about how to allocate his 
or her property.”); see also infra Section I.A. 
 3.  See John C.P. Goldberg & Robert H. Sitkoff, Torts and Estates: Remedying Wrongful 
Interference with Inheritance, 65 STAN. L. REV. 335, 342 (2013) (“The interest of a prospective 
beneficiary under a will or will substitute does not ripen into a cognizable legal right until the 
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disposition of property after death has consequently become known as dead 
hand control.4 
But just as the inheritance process is guided by the decisions of the dead, 
it is also influenced by the choices of the living.  When the donor names a 
donee in their estate plan, that donee is not a passive participant in the 
distribution of the donor’s property.  To the contrary, the donee must 
affirmatively decide whether to accept or reject the gift from the donor.5  If 
the donee accepts the gift, the property becomes theirs, but if the donee rejects 
the gift, the property is distributed to an alternate donee.6  Thus, the law of 
succession grants control not only to the dead hand of the donor but also to 
the live hand of the donee.7 
The rationale underlying the law’s deference to individual 
decisionmakers is that donors and donees are in the best position to evaluate 
their own specific circumstances, and they can, therefore, make estate-
planning decisions that generate the greatest utility from the transfer of the 
donor’s estate.8  The donor can choose the donees that they believe will 
benefit the most,9 and the donee can decide whether a particular gift would 
truly be beneficial.10  In this way, inheritance law seeks to maximize social 
welfare.11  However, despite this social welfare rationale of the law’s 
deferential approach to inheritance, the law restrains both the donor’s and the 
donee’s freedom to make estate-planning decisions in various 
                                                                    
donor’s death.  Until then, a prospective beneficiary has a mere ‘expectancy’ that is subject to 
defeasance at the donor’s whim.”). 
 4.  See Mountain Brow Lodge No. 82, Indep. Order of Odd Fellows v. Toscano, 64 Cal. Rptr. 
816, 820 n.* (Cal. Ct. App. 1967) (“[D]ead hand control [is] the right of the individual to control 
property after death . . . .”); Robert H. Sitkoff, Trusts and Estates: Implementing Freedom of 
Disposition, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 643, 643–44 (2014) (“The American law of succession embraces 
freedom of disposition, authorizing dead hand control, to an extent that is unique among modern 
legal systems.”). 
 5.  See Adam J. Hirsch, The Problem of the Insolvent Heir, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 587, 588 
(1989) (“The beneficiary of a gratuity may accept or reject it at his discretion.”); see also UNIF. 
DISCLAIMER OF PROP. INTERESTS ACTS, prefatory note (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON 
UNIF. STATE LAWS 2002) (explaining that the donee’s ability to accept or reject a testamentary gift 
is “comprehensive” and that the law is generally “designed to allow every sort of disclaimer”). 
 6.  See JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 140 (9th 
ed. 2013). 
 7.  The term “live hand control” has been used previously to describe the trustee’s authority 
to make decisions regarding property held in trust.  Keith L. Butler, Comment, Long Live the Dead 
Hand: A Case for Repeal of the Rule Against Perpetuities in Washington, 75 WASH. L. REV. 1237, 
1257 (2000). 
 8.  See Kelly, supra note 1, at 1135; see also infra Part I. 
 9.  See Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 68 
IND. L.J. 1, 12–13 (1992); Kelly, supra note 1, at 1136; see also infra Section I.A. 
 10.  See Mark Glover, Freedom of Inheritance, 2017 UTAH  L. REV. 283, 295–97 (2017); see 
also infra Section I.B. 
 11.  See Glover, supra note 10, at 295; Kelly, supra note 1, at 1135. 
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circumstances.12  Put simply, there are some decisions that the law does not 
rely upon donors and donees to make. 
This Article will focus on the restraints the law places on the donee’s 
freedom to decide whether to accept or reject a gift from the donor’s estate.13  
These live hand restraints can be classified into two general types: one type 
restrains the donee’s ability to accept a gift,14 and the other type restrains the 
donee’s ability to reject a gift.15  Although legal scholars have devoted 
considerable attention to the study of each type of live hand restraint, they 
typically have focused on one type or the other without exploring possible 
connections between the two.16 
This inattention to the relationship between the two types of live hand 
restraints has left inconsistencies in the law to go unnoticed and has perhaps 
stalled reforms that are consistent with the law’s effort to maximize social 
welfare.  This Article therefore will analyze the law’s restraints of acceptance 
and its restraints of rejection in tandem and explain how they address similar 
social welfare concerns.  Moreover, by bringing together the two general 
types of live hand restraints, this Article will seek to develop a unifying 
theoretical framework that can guide policymakers in deciding when and how 
to restrain the donee’s discretion to accept or reject a gift.  Ultimately, 
informed by the insights gleaned from a comparative analysis of the two 
types of live hand restraints, this Article will explore specific reform 
proposals that can increase the social welfare generated by the inheritance 
process. 
                                                                    
 12.  For example, the law typically requires the donor to transfer a portion of their estate to their 
surviving spouse, thereby preventing the donor from transferring the property to other donees.  See 
DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 6, at 512–16; see, e.g., UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-202 (NAT’L 
CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2010).  Similarly, the law denies the donee the 
ability to avoid federal tax liens by rejecting a gift from the donor.  DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra 
note 6, at 142–43; see, e.g., Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49 (1999); see also infra notes 94–100 
and accompanying text.   
 13.  For scholarship focusing on the restrictions that the law places on the donor’s freedom of 
disposition, see Mark Glover, A Social Welfare Theory of Inheritance Regulation, 2018 UTAH L. 
REV. 411 (2018); Adam J. Hirsch, Freedom of Testation / Freedom of Contract, 95 MINN. L. REV. 
2180 (2011); Kelly, supra note 1. 
 14.  See infra Section II.A.1. 
 15.  See infra Section II.A.2. 
 16.  For scholarship focusing on restraints of the donee’s ability to accept, see, for example, 
Richard Lewis Brown, Undeserving Heirs?—The Case of the “Terminated” Parent, 40 U. RICH. L. 
REV. 547 (2006); Karen J. Sneddon, Should Cain’s Children Inherit Abel’s Property?: Wading Into 
the Extended Slayer Rule Quagmire, 76 UMKC L. REV. 101 (2007); Carla Spivack, Killers 
Shouldn’t Inherit from Their Victims—Or Should They?, 48 GA. L. REV. 145, 194 (2013).  For 
scholarship focusing on restraints of the donee’s ability to reject a gift, see, for example, Adam J. 
Hirsch, Disclaimers and Federalism, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1871, 1872 (2014); Reid Kress Weisbord, 
The Governmental Stake in Private Wealth Transfer, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1229, 1245 (2018).  In some 
instances, connections between the two types of live hand restraints have been made.  See, e.g., 
DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 6, at 127–40 (discussing both the slayer rule and disclaimers 
under a common heading of “BARS TO SUCCESSION”). 
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This Article will proceed in four Parts.  Part I will describe the law’s 
general deference to both the dead hand of the donor and the live hand of the 
donee.  In particular, it will explain how the law attempts to maximize social 
welfare through deference to individual decisionmakers.  Part II will identify 
the restraints that the law places on the donee’s ability to accept or reject 
testamentary gifts and analyze how such restraints of the live hand can further 
the law’s goal of maximizing social welfare.  Part III then will compare and 
contrast the two general types of live hand restraints and argue that 
inconsistencies between the two types undermine the law’s social welfare 
goals.  Finally, Part IV will identify opportunities for policymakers to reform 
live hand restraints that both harmonize these inconsistencies and maximize 
social welfare. 
I.  INHERITANCE AUTONOMY AND SOCIAL WELFARE 
The autonomous decisionmakers regarding inheritance include both the 
donor and the donee.17  To be sure, the donor must make the initial decisions 
concerning how they would like their property distributed upon death.18  But 
the donee is not a passive actor within the process of inheritance; indeed, after 
the donor’s death, the donee must decide whether to accept or reject a gift 
from the donor.19  The law generally does not require the donee to accept a 
transfer from the donor’s estate.  Instead, the law grants the donee the 
discretion to decide for themselves whether to accept the gift.20  Whereas the 
donor’s autonomy to freely decide how to dispose of property is referred to 
as “freedom of disposition,”21 the donee’s autonomy to decide whether to 
accept or reject an inheritance is referred to as “freedom of inheritance.”22 
A.  Dead Hand Control 
The Restatement (Third) of Property (the “Restatement”) places 
freedom of disposition at the center of the modern law of succession when it 
states, “The organizing principle of the American law of donative transfers 
is freedom of disposition.  Property owners have the nearly unrestricted right 
                                                                    
 17.  See generally Glover, supra note 10. 
 18.  See Weisbord, supra note 16, at 1245 (explaining that donors have “a broad power to 
determine who gets what”); see also infra Section I.A. 
 19.  See Hirsch, supra note 5, at 588; see also infra Section I.B. 
 20.  See UNIF. DISCLAIMER OF PROP. INTERESTS ACT § 5 cmt. (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF 
COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2002) (explaining “the principle behind all disclaimers,” and 
therefore the donee’s discretion to accept or reject a gift from the donor, is that “no one can be 
forced to accept property”); see also infra notes 46–47 and accompanying text. 
 21.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 
cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2003); Sitkoff, supra note 4, at 643. 
 22.  See generally Glover, supra note 10.  For other uses of the term “freedom of inheritance” 
see id. at 284 n.5. 
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to dispose of their property as they please.”23  Thus, the law grants the donor 
the ability to make estate-planning decisions, and it generally does not second 
guess those decisions.24  The underlying rationale of the law’s deferential 
approach to inheritance is that such a system maximizes social welfare.25  As 
Professor Daniel Kelly explains, “[m]ost scholars today” view testamentary 
freedom from a “functional perspective [that] emphasizes the ‘social welfare’ 
of the parties and seeks to determine how the law can create the best 
incentives for the donor, donees, and other parties that a donor’s disposition 
of property may affect.”26  Professor Kelly’s explanation suggests freedom 
of disposition can increase social welfare in a number of ways, including by 
increasing the individual welfare of both the donor and potential donees and 
by implementing incentives that encourage socially beneficial behavior. 
First, freedom of disposition maximizes the individual welfare of the 
donor.27  Autonomy over the distribution of property at death can be a source 
                                                                    
 23.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 
cmt. a; see also In re Estate of Malloy, 949 P.2d 804, 806 (Wash. 1998) (“A basic principle 
underlying any discussion of the law of wills is that an individual has the right and the freedom to 
dispose of his or her property, upon death, according to the dictates of his or her own desires.”); 
THOMAS P. GALLANIS, FAMILY PROPERTY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON WILLS, TRUSTS, AND 
FUTURE INTERESTS 349 (5th ed. 2011) (“Freedom of disposition is a hallmark of the American law 
of succession.”); Mark Glover, A Taxonomy of Testamentary Intent, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 569, 
569 (2016) (“[A] will’s validity and the ultimate disposition of the decedent’s estate . . . turn upon 
the decedent’s testamentary intent.”); Hirsch, supra note 5, at 632 (“[C]ourts traditionally exalt 
freedom of testation and the fulfillment of testamentary intent as central to gratuitous transfers 
policy.”); Paula A. Monopoli, Toward Equality: Nonmarital Children and the Uniform Probate 
Code, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 995, 1010 n.94 (2012) (“Freedom of testation and testator’s intent 
are frequently identified as paramount jurisprudential touchstones in the area of trusts and estates.”); 
E. Gary Spitko, Gone But Not Conforming: Protecting the Abhorrent Testator from Majoritarian 
Cultural Norms Through Minority-Culture Arbitration, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 275, 278 (1999) 
(“The ideal of testamentary freedom grounds the law of testation.”). 
 24.  See Cantrell v. Cantrell, No. M2002-02883-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 3044907, at *5 (Tenn. 
Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2004) (“A fundamental principle of the law of wills is that a testator is entitled to 
dispose of the testator’s property as [they] see[] fit, regardless of any perceived injustice that may 
result from such a choice.”); Sitkoff, supra note 4, at 644 (“The right of a property owner to dispose 
of his or her property on terms that he or she chooses has come to be recognized as a separate stick 
in the bundle of rights called property.”); Reid Kress Weisbord, Wills for Everyone: Helping 
Individuals Opt Out of Intestacy, 53 B.C. L. REV. 877, 882 (2012) (“The most fundamental guiding 
principle of American inheritance law is testamentary freedom—that the person who owns property 
during life has the power to direct its disposition at death.”). 
 25.  See Pamela R. Champine, My Will Be Done: Accommodating the Erring and the Atypical 
Testator, 80 NEB. L. REV. 387, 432 (2001) (“The most prevalent justification for testamentary 
freedom is the utilitarian view which posits that testamentary freedom is not a right but rather a 
privilege offered for the purpose of motivating socially desirable behavior.”); Eva E. Subotnik, 
Copyright and the Living Dead?: Succession Law and the Postmortem Term, 29 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 77, 96 (2015) (“Support for a system of testamentary freedom—whether one focuses on the 
right of testation or of inheritance—is often based on utilitarian goals of promoting happiness.”). 
 26.  Kelly, supra note 1, at 1135. 
 27.  See id. at 1135–36. 
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of happiness to the donor during their life,28 especially when the donor knows 
that they can take care of close family and friends through the distribution of 
their estate.29  If the law substantially curtailed dead hand control, then the 
donor would lose this source of comfort and satisfaction; their individual 
welfare would decrease; and consequently social welfare as a whole would 
decline.30  Thus, by maximizing the donor’s individual welfare through its 
deferential approach to inheritance, the law seeks to maximize overall social 
welfare. 
Second, the donor’s freedom of disposition maximizes the individual 
welfare of donees.31  The law’s deferential approach to inheritance allows the 
donor to examine the needs and circumstances of potential donees and to 
place property in the hands of those who will benefit the most.32  If the law 
did not defer to dead hand control, state legislators and probate judges would 
have to make decisions regarding the distribution of the donor’s estate.  These 
legislators and judges are not as well positioned as the donor to compare the 
needs of all potential donees and to gauge the relative merits of the vast array 
of possible dispositions of property.33  Consequently, their estate planning 
                                                                    
 28.  See Mark Glover, A Therapeutic Jurisprudential Framework of Estate Planning, 35 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 427, 445 (2012) (“The most basic therapeutic consequence of the autonomous 
decision-making permitted by testamentary freedom is the testators’ satisfaction of knowing that 
they have wide latitude to prepare an estate plan that best fulfills their preferences.”); Hirsch & 
Wang, supra note 9, at 8 (explaining that “modern social scientists” assume “that persons derive 
satisfaction out of bequeathing property to others”); Hirsch, supra note 13, at 2187 (“Gratuitous 
transfers . . . gratify a benefactor, whose happiness depends on [the recipients’ happiness].”); 
Subotnik, supra note 25, at 96 (“In its simplest incarnation, the intuition is that the ability to leave 
property to the persons of one’s choosing provides a sense of comfort and happiness.”). 
 29.  See Glover, supra note 28, at 445 (“Of the various preferences that testators can satisfy 
through freedom of testation, perhaps the most urgent and universal is the care of their families after 
the testators’ own deaths.”); Edward C. Halbach, Jr., An Introduction to Chapters 1–4, in DEATH, 
TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY 3, 5 (Edward C. Halbach, Jr. ed., 1977) (“[A] society should be 
concerned with the total amount of happiness it can offer, and to many of its members it is a great 
comfort and satisfaction to know during life that, even after death, those whom one cares about can 
be provided for and may be able to enjoy better lives because of the inheritance that can be left to 
them.”). 
 30.  See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 65 (2004) 
(explaining that “[i]n an important sense, bequeathing property is simply one way of using property.  
And therefore society should not interfere with bequests” because “this tends to reduce individuals’ 
utility directly (a person will derive less utility from property if he wants to bequeath it but is 
prevented from doing so)”); see Hirsch & Wang, supra note 9, at 8 (“To the extent that lawmakers 
deny persons the opportunity to bequeath freely, the subjective value of property will drop, for one 
of its potential uses will have disappeared.”); Gordon Tullock, Inheritance Justified, 14 U. CHI. J.L. 
& ECON. 465, 474 (1971) (“Individuals before their death would be injured if they are prohibited 
from passing on their estate to their heirs because it eliminates one possible alternative which they 
might otherwise choose.”). 
 31.  See Hirsch, supra note 13, at 2187 (“Gratuitous transfers obviously benefit 
recipients . . . .”). 
 32.  See Hirsch & Wang, supra note 9, at 12; Kelly, supra note 1, at 1136–37. 
 33.  See Kelly, supra note 1, at 1136–37. 
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decisions likely would not put the donor’s property to its best use.34  The 
law’s grant of freedom of disposition, by contrast, maximizes social welfare 
by allowing the donor to engage in “intelligent estate planning,”35 which 
more likely places property in the hands of donees who will benefit the 
most.36 
Finally, freedom of disposition maximizes social welfare by 
incentivizing socially beneficial behavior both by the donor and by potential 
donees.  With respect to the donor, the law’s deference to the dead hand 
encourages them to generate wealth during life.37  By contrast, if the law did 
not defer to the donor’s estate planning decisions, then the donor might not 
find it as worthwhile to engage in productive activities,38 and overall societal 
wealth might decline.39  With respect to potential donees, freedom of 
disposition encourages them to care for the donor during times of ill health 
or old age.40  If donees know that the donor has the ability either to punish 
them through disinheritance or reward them with a handsome bequest, then 
they will more likely cater to the donor’s needs.41  This incentive increases 
                                                                    
 34.  See id. 
 35.  Hirsch & Wang, supra note 9, at 12. 
 36.  See Adam J. Hirsch, Spendthrift Trusts and Public Policy: Economic and Cognitive 
Perspectives, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 44 (1995) (“Certainly, benefactors can be expected to possess 
the information and insight into their families’ affairs necessary to distribute their wealth in a 
rational manner.”); Michael Rosenbloum, Give Me Liberty and Give Me Death: The Conflict 
Between Copyright Law and Estates Law, 4 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 163, 177 (1996) (“Testamentary 
freedom . . . allows the testator to weigh the varying needs of his family.”); Joshua C. Tate, 
Conditional Love: Incentive Trusts and the Inflexibility Problem, 41 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 
445, 484 (2006) (“[T]he testator . . . can distribute property in accordance [with] each family 
member’s needs.”). 
 37.  See Hirsch & Wang, supra note 9, at 8 (“[F]reedom of testation creates an incentive to 
industry and saving.”); Hirsch, supra note 13, at 2187 (“Giving persons the right to make a will . . . 
encourages them to produce and to save more wealth, . . . adding to the sum of capital stock.” 
(footnote omitted)); Jeffrey E. Stake, Darwin, Donations, and the Illusion of Dead Hand Control, 
64 TUL. L. REV. 705, 749 (1990) (“Allowing owners to give their assets and money to others, 
whether at death or inter vivos, creates an incentive for productive activities.”); Subotnik, supra 
note 25, at 96–97 (“[Some] commentators have focused . . . on the . . . notion that testamentary 
freedom generates a more productive citizenry, since individuals have motivations not just to save, 
but also to produce wealth in the first place.”). 
 38.  See SHAVELL, supra note 30, at 65 (explaining that restricting freedom of disposition 
“lowers [individuals’] incentives to work (a person will not work as hard to accumulate property if 
he cannot then bequeath it as he pleases)”). 
 39.  See Hirsch & Wang, supra note 9, at 8 (“[T]hwarted testators will choose to accumulate 
less property, and the total stock of wealth existing at any given time will shrink.”); see also 
Subotnik, supra note 25, at 96 (“Such incentives promote wealth maximization—a gauge of utility 
maximization for some—since individuals have reasons to accumulate wealth over and above that 
which is needed during their own lifetimes.” (footnote omitted)). 
 40.  See Hirsch, supra note 13, at 2187–88; Kelly, supra note 1, at 1137. 
 41.  See Joshua C. Tate, Caregiving and the Case for Testamentary Freedom, 42 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 129, 179 (2008) (explaining that “[t]he U.S. rule” of broad freedom of disposition “allows 
a parent to punish a child for failing to provide care, but it also allows a parent to reward a child . . . 
who does provide care”); see also Hirsch, supra note 13, at 2235 (suggesting that “the behaviors 
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social welfare because, as Professors Adam Hirsch and William Wang 
explain, it “supports . . . a market for the provision of social services” and 
“encourages . . . beneficiaries to provide [the donor] with care and comfort—
services that add to the total economic ‘pie.’”42  Therefore, by granting the 
donor broad freedom of disposition, the law seeks not only to increase the 
individual welfare of donors and donees but also to incentivize donors and 
donees in socially beneficial ways, all of which maximizes overall social 
welfare. 
B.  Live Hand Control 
Just as the law grants the donor broad freedom of disposition, it also 
grants the donee broad freedom of inheritance.43  Thus, when the donor 
names a donee as a beneficiary of their estate, the donee has the option either 
to accept the gift or reject it.44  As Professor Hirsch explains, “Most 
beneficiaries accept inheritances with open arms; other ones prefer, for 
whatever reason, to reject them.  Under most circumstances today, 
beneficiaries are free to accept or reject an inheritance as they see fit.”45  In 
the terminology of inheritance law, the donee exercises their discretion to 
reject a gift by “disclaiming” their interest in the donor’s property.46  When 
the donee disclaims an inheritance, the donee is treated as having predeceased 
the donor, and the disclaimed property is distributed to alternate donees.47  
The law therefore generally defers not only to the dead hand of the donor 
regarding how property should be distributed but also to the live hand of the 
donee regarding whether property is accepted or rejected. 
                                                                    
parents might seek to elicit” through the exercise of freedom of disposition “take many forms, but 
one of them now looms in importance,” namely “end-of-life care giving”). 
 42.  Hirsch & Wang, supra note 9, at 9–10; see Hirsch, supra note 13, at 2234 (explaining that 
“[g]ranting parents leeway to vary or deny bequests to children produces economic benefits of the 
sort that freedom of testation ideally achieves”). 
 43.  See Glover, supra note 10, at 292; see also supra Section I.A. 
 44.  See Hirsch, supra note 5, at 588. 
 45.  Hirsch, supra note 16, at 1872 (footnote omitted). 
 46.  See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 6, at 140.  “By traditional usage, an heir 
renounces; a beneficiary under a will disclaims.  Today, the two words are used interchangeably as 
synonyms.  The term disclaimer is the one more commonly used to describe the formal refusal to 
take by an heir or a beneficiary.”  Id. at 140 n.81. 
 47.  See Adam J. Hirsch, Revisions in Need of Revising: The Uniform Disclaimer of Property 
Interests Act, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 109, 163 (2001) (“In the absence of testamentary instructions, 
disclaimed property goes to whomever would have received it had the disclaimant predeceased the 
benefactor, as determined by the state’s antilapse and intestacy statutes; but if a will does anticipate 
this contingency by naming a substitute beneficiary in the event that the primary beneficiary 
disclaims, that stipulation controls the devolution of the property.” (footnote omitted)).  “Under 
UDPIA, a contingency clause specifying how a bequest will devolve in the event the beneficiary 
predeceases is broadly construed to govern the devolution of a bequest a surviving beneficiary 
disclaims.”  Id. at 163 n.263. 
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As explained above, the law’s deference to the dead hand has social 
welfare benefits,48 and, in various ways, so too does the law’s deference to 
the live hand.  First, freedom of inheritance maximizes the donee’s individual 
welfare.49  Although the donor is in a better position than state legislators or 
probate judges to assess the utility of the donor’s estate plan,50 the donee is 
perhaps in the best position to evaluate the benefit that they would receive 
from a specific transfer from the donor’s estate.  By granting the donee 
freedom of inheritance, the law allows the donee to evaluate a gift from the 
donor and to accept it only if it will increase their individual welfare.51  As 
the Supreme Court of Georgia explained, “Property is a burden as well as a 
benefit, and whoever is unwilling to bear the burden for the sake of the 
benefit, is at liberty to decline both.”52  Thus, if a gift from the donor will 
increase the donee’s individual welfare, the donee will accept it, but if the 
burdens of the gift outweigh its benefits, the donee will disclaim the gift.  In 
this way, the law’s grant of freedom of inheritance and its consequent respect 
for the donee’s autonomy maximizes social welfare. 
Second, the donee’s freedom of inheritance maximizes most donor’s 
individual welfare.53  As explained previously, the donor’s ability to select 
what property should go to which beneficiaries can be a source of comfort 
and satisfaction for the donor.54  And although the donee’s ability to reject a 
gift would seem to undermine the donor’s intent, freedom of inheritance 
actually increases the social welfare benefits of freedom of disposition 
because most donors likely want the donee to have the option to accept or 
reject a gift.  By naming a donee as a beneficiary of the donor’s estate, the 
donor likely intends to confer a benefit to the donee, and therefore the welfare 
of the donor is linked to the welfare of the donee.55  Put simply, the donor’s 
                                                                    
 48.  See supra Section I.A. 
 49.  See Glover, supra note 10, at 295–97. 
 50.  See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text. 
 51.  See Hirsch, supra note 47, at 117 (“Only later, after the feudal incidents were abolished, 
did British courts come to allow disclaimers by devisees, for the very different purpose of permitting 
beneficiaries to escape bequests that might be ‘clothed in trust,’ or otherwise entail burdensome 
responsibilities.”); Andrew S. Bender, Note, Disclaimer Law: A Call for Statutory Reform, 2001 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 887, 898 (2001) (“[T]he belief prevails that the disclaimant should not be forced to 
accept a gift if doing so would impose too great a burden on her.  Essentially, there is a general 
agreement and recognition that any individual using a disclaimer in this manner possesses a valid 
motive.” (footnote ommitted)). 
 52.  Daniel v. Frost, 62 Ga. 697, 706 (1879). 
 53.  See Glover, supra note 10, at 297–99. 
 54.  See supra notes 27–30 and accompanying text. 
 55.  See SHAVELL, supra note 30, at 58 (“A major motivation for giving a gift is pure altruism: 
The donor cares about the well-being of the donee; that is, the donor obtains utility from the utility 
of the donee.”); Louis Kaplow, On the Taxation of Private Transfers, 63 TAX L. REV. 159, 176 
(2009) (“One possibility is that donors are to an extent altruistic, which is to say that raising the 
utility of their donees increases their own utility.  Altruism seems to be evidenced, for example, by 
parents’ hard work aimed to improve their children’s prospects in life.”). 
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welfare increases from their knowledge that the donee’s welfare will increase 
as a result of the gift.56  Under this line of reasoning, the donor would not 
want the donee to accept property that is more burdensome than beneficial.  
Freedom of inheritance consequently increases the donor’s welfare by 
providing them the peace of mind that the donee’s welfare will not decrease 
as a result of a gift.57 
Finally, freedom of inheritance maximizes social welfare by allowing 
the donee to engage in postmortem estate planning.58  Although the donor is 
in the best position to evaluate the utility of their estate plan and consequently 
the law generally relies upon the donor to make decisions regarding the 
distribution of their property,59 there is no guarantee that the donor will 
exercise their freedom of disposition in a way that maximizes social 
welfare.60  Indeed, for various reasons, the donor might die with an estate 
plan that is suboptimal from a social welfare perspective.61  For instance, the 
donor might make poor decisions because they have imperfect information 
at the time they craft their estate plan.62  The donor makes estate-planning 
                                                                    
 56.  See Hirsch, supra note 13, at 2187 (“Although benefactors cannot share in a beneficiary’s 
utility from an inheritance at the time of its receipt, they can envision it, and derive present utility 
from its anticipation.”); Kelly, supra note 1, at 1148–49 (“A gift . . . may increase the donor’s 
happiness due to altruism.  If a donor is altruistic, the donor’s utility is a function of the donees’ 
utility, i.e., the preferences of the donor incorporate the well-being of the donees.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 57.  Of course, a donor’s motivations for giving are not limited to pure altruism (for example, 
self-interest or feelings of obligation); however, even if the donor is motivated by other concerns, 
the donee’s freedom of inheritance likely does not undermine freedom of disposition’s social 
welfare benefits.  See Glover, supra note 10, at 297–99. 
 58.  See id. at 299–311. 
 59.  See supra notes 32–36 and accompanying text. 
 60.  See Hirsch & Wang, supra note 9, at 13 (“[T]he assumption that [donors] will in general 
use freedom of [disposition] to craft thoughtful schemes of distribution is not unproblematic. . . . 
[The donor] may know best; but, alas, we have no assurance that in practice he will do what is best.” 
(emphases omitted)); see also Kelly, supra note 1, at 1138 (“Effectuating a donor’s ex ante interests 
is not necessarily equivalent to maximizing social welfare.”). 
 61.  In addition to the problem of imperfect information that is discussed in this Section, moral 
hazard concerns and transaction costs might cause the donor to leave behind a suboptimal estate 
plan, and the donor’s freedom of inheritance can address these concerns.  See Glover, supra note 
10, at 297–310. 
 62.  See Richard C. Ausness, Sherlock Holmes and the Problem of the Dead Hand: The 
Modification and Termination of “Irrevocable” Trusts, 28 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 237, 295 (2015) 
(“According to one school of thought, imperfect information, particularly about future events and 
circumstances, may cause donors to make dispositions of their property that they would not have 
made had they been better prognosticators.  Unfortunately, once the donor is dead, such decisions 
cannot be reversed.”) (footnote omitted)); Hirsch, supra note 13, at 2239 (“When providing for 
existing family members, a testator brings to the estate-planning process a depth of knowledge 
gleaned from a lifetime of interaction with them.  But the same temporal horizon that obstructs tacit 
bargains between a testator and future generations clouds his or her ability to see—and hence to see 
to—their needs.” (emphasis omitted)); Kelly, supra note 1, at 1158 (“Future events are difficult to 
foresee and unanticipated contingencies may arise.  As a result, a donor may dispose of property in 
a way that contradicts what the donor would have wanted with complete information.”). 
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decisions during their lifetime, but those decisions have no effect until some 
point in the future when they die.  Because the donor plans for the future 
based only upon their presently known information, circumstances might 
change in ways that render their estate plan ineffective in maximizing social 
welfare.63 
The donee’s freedom of inheritance, however, partially addresses this 
problem of imperfect information.  Because the donee makes their decision 
whether to accept or reject a gift after the donor dies, the donee has better 
information regarding the circumstances that exist when the donor’s estate 
plan becomes effective.64  As such, the donee can reassess the donor’s 
decision to leave property to them with a better understanding of the utility 
that the transfer will produce.  If the donee determines that the property is put 
to its best use in their own hands, they can accept the gift.  But if the donee 
determines that the alternate taker would benefit more, they can increase the 
welfare generated by the donor’s estate by disclaiming the gift.  In sum, with 
the benefit of better information, the donee can maximize the utility of the 
donor’s estate plan.  Therefore, freedom of inheritance maximizes social 
welfare by not only increasing the individual welfare of both the donor and 
the donee but also by allowing the donee to engage in postmortem estate 
planning. 
II.  RESTRAINING THE LIVE HAND 
While the law typically defers to the donee’s discretion regarding 
whether to accept or reject a gift from the donor,65 freedom of inheritance has 
limits.  Although the donee’s discretion to accept or reject a transfer from the 
donor’s estate has been described as an “absolute right,”66 Professor Hirsch 
explains that “[n]either history nor current theory supports the notion that 
citizens must enjoy complete transactional liberty.”67  Professor Hirsch 
points out that the law restricts an individual’s transactional liberty in a 
variety of contexts,68 which include limiting both freedom of contract and 
freedom of disposition.  The law’s treatment of freedom of inheritance is no 
different.  It grants the donee discretion to accept or reject testamentary 
                                                                    
 63.  See David Horton, Unconscionability in the Law of Trusts, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1675, 
1703 (2009) (“Even the savviest investor cannot predict how to allocate assets efficiently in the 
distant future.”); see also Reid Kress Weisbord, Federalizing Principles of Donative Intent and 
Unanticipated Circumstances, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1931, 1936 (2014) (“Had the donor known of 
circumstances causing the original beneficiary to disclaim, the donor presumably would have 
skipped the original beneficiary altogether in favor of the next eligible beneficiary.”). 
 64.  See Glover, supra note 10, at 302–06. 
 65.  See supra Section I.B. 
 66.  Dean David Gamin, Note, Renunciation of Testamentary Benefit as Fraudulent Transfer, 
37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 148, 159 (1986). 
 67.  Hirsch, supra note 5, at 627 (footnote omitted). 
 68.  Id. 
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transfers; but, in certain situations, it restricts the donee’s discretion.  In other 
words, just as the law restrains the dead hand of the donor, it also restrains 
the live hand of the donee. 
A.  Restraints 
The restraints that the law places on the donee’s freedom of inheritance 
can be separated into two categories: (1) restraints of acceptance and (2) 
restraints of rejection.  Restraints of acceptance deny the donee the ability to 
accept property from the donor’s estate under certain circumstances.69  
Conversely, restraints of rejection limit the donee’s freedom of inheritance 
by eliminating beneficial consequences of a donee’s decision to disclaim 
property under some scenarios.70  Whereas restraints of acceptance force the 
donee to reject a transfer from the donor, restraints of rejection increase the 
likelihood that the donee will accept a transfer from the donor. 
1.  Restraints of Acceptance 
Restraints of acceptance limit the donee’s ability to accept a transfer by 
requiring them to disclaim it.  Although in recent years other such restraints 
have emerged,71 the slayer rule is the traditional example of a restraint that 
the law places on the donee’s ability to accept a transfer from the donor.  The 
details of the rule vary from state to state,72 but, in general, the slayer rule 
prevents a donee who intentionally kills the donor from benefiting from their 
victim.73  The killer cannot take from their victim regardless of whether the 
donor names the killer as a donee in a will or a non-probate will substitute or 
whether the transfer is the result of the donor dying intestate.74  Moreover, 
                                                                    
 69.  See infra Section II.A.1. 
 70.  See infra Section II.A.2. 
 71.  See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 6, at 139–40; see also infra notes 87–89 and 
accompanying text. 
 72.  See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 6, at 137–39. 
 73.  See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-803(b) (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE 
LAWS 2010) (“An individual who feloniously and intentionally kills the decedent forfeits all 
benefits . . . with respect to the decedent’s estate . . . .”).  One area of variation amongst the states 
relates to how the court determines that the donee killed the donor.  See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, 
supra note 6, at 138.  Additionally, in some states, the slayer rule does not merely prevent the 
murderous donee from accepting a gift from their victim.  Instead, under certain circumstances, the 
rule also prohibits the slayer’s descendants from accepting a gift from the victim.  See DUKEMINIER 
& SITKOFF, supra note 6, at 138 (explaining “[s]ome states extend the bar by statute to the killer’s 
descendants,” and “[o]ther states limit the right of the killer’s descendants to take by case law”); see 
generally Sneddon, supra note 16. 
 74.  See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-803(b) (explaining the killer “forfeits all benefits . . . with 
respect to the decedent’s estate, including an intestate share, an elective share, an omitted spouse’s 
or child’s share, a homestead allowance, exempt property, and a family allowance”).  Although it is 
well established that the slayer rule bars the killer from taking from the donor’s probate estate, there 
may still be some uncertainty as to whether the slayer rule applies to nonprobate will substitutes.  
See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 6, at 137. 
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with one or two exceptions,75 all states bar the killer from inheriting even 
when the donor expressly provides that a donee should benefit regardless of 
whether the donee kills them.76 
The slayer rule need not be characterized as a restraint of the donee’s 
freedom of inheritance.  Instead, the rule could be framed as a majoritarian 
default rule that is designed to fulfill the donor’s probable intent.77  Under 
this characterization, because most donors would not want their killers to 
benefit from their estates,78 the law revokes their gifts, thereby achieving a 
result that most likely comports with the donor’s intent.  Alternatively, the 
slayer rule could be framed as a restraint of the donor’s freedom of 
disposition.79  Under this characterization, the donor should not be able to 
give property to their killer because the exercise of freedom of disposition in 
this way would undermine the law’s social welfare goals.80 
Despite the slayer rule’s characterization as either a majoritarian default 
rule that implements the donor’s probable intent or a restraint of the donor’s 
freedom of disposition that limits dead hand control, the Restatement makes 
clear that the object of the rule’s focus is the donee and not the donor.  It 
explains, “The [slayer rule] is sometimes described as [a rule] that ‘revokes’ 
any provision in the testator’s will in favor of the killer.”81  However, the 
rule’s “governing principle is the supervening public policy that prevents a 
wrongdoer from profiting from the wrong, and not revocation by the 
testator.”82 
Under this characterization, which emphasizes the conduct of the donee, 
the slayer rule can be framed as a limitation on freedom of inheritance that 
denies the killer the discretion to accept a transfer from the donor’s estate by 
requiring them to reject it.  Simply put, the slayer rule forces the killer to 
                                                                    
 75.  See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 6, at 137 (identifying Wisconsin and Louisiana 
as two possible exceptions). 
 76.  See id. (“Suppose H, aware of W’s psychological instability, provides in his will for the 
creation of a trust for the benefit of W even if W kills him.  W then kills H.  Does W take? . . . In [the 
vast majority of] states, the answer appears to be No.”). 
 77.  See Thomas E. Simmons, A Chinese Inheritance, 30 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 124, 131 
(2017) (“Still another potential rationale for the slayer rule is simply presumed majoritarian 
intent . . . .”).  Professor Hirsch suggests that this rationale is not the primary justification of the 
slayer rule.  See Adam J. Hirsch, Text and Time: A Theory of Testamentary Obsolescence, 86 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 609, 621 (2009) (“The rule’s alternative justification as a means of effectuating testators’ 
probable wishes has not gone unnoticed, but it is plainly subordinate.” (footnote omitted)). 
 78.  See Hirsch, supra note 13, at 2214 (“This rule adjusts the estate plan to the probable intent 
of the victim in most instances, for testators rarely wish to provide for their assassins . . . .”). 
 79.  See id. (describing the slayer rule as a “restriction on freedom of testation”). 
 80.  But see Glover, supra note 13, at 445–54 (arguing that, when characterized as a restraint 
of the donor’s freedom of disposition, the traditional slayer rule does not maximize social welfare 
and proposing reforms). 
 81.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 4.1 cmt. r 
(AM. LAW. INST. 1999). 
 82.  Id. 
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disclaim their interest in the donor’s property.  The connection between a 
voluntary disclaimer and an involuntary disclaimer through the application 
of the slayer rule is evident in how the law disposes the donor’s property in 
both contexts.  When the donee voluntarily disclaims a transfer, the law 
directs the donee’s gift to the alternate donee who would have benefited from 
the transfer had the primary donee died before the donor.83  Likewise, when 
the slayer rule requires the donee to disclaim a transfer, the law distributes 
the donor’s property as though the killer predeceased the donor.84  In fact, the 
Uniform Probate Code makes this connection explicit by simply treating the 
killer as if they disclaimed their interest in the donor’s estate.85  The slayer 
rule can therefore be seen as restraining the donee’s freedom of inheritance 
by denying the killer the discretion to accept a transfer from the donor’s 
estate. 
In addition to the traditional slayer rule, other restraints of acceptance 
have recently emerged in a few states that prevent the donee from taking from 
the donor’s estate based upon some type of misconduct.86  For example, some 
states bar a donee who physically abuses the donor from accepting a gift from 
their victim.87  Similarly, others bar a donee who engages in certain types of 
financial misconduct from taking from their victim’s estate.88  The donees 
who are barred from taking a gift from the donor, whether by the traditional 
                                                                    
 83.  See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 6, at 140; Hirsch, supra note 47, at 163. 
 84.  See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 6, at 138 (“The prevailing view is that the killer 
is treated as having predeceased the victim.”). 
 85.  UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-803(b) (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 
2010) (explaining that “[i]f the decedent died intestate, the decedent’s intestate estate passes as if 
the killer disclaimed his [or her] intestate share”); id. § 2-803(e) (explaining that “[p]rovisions of a 
governing instrument . . . are given effect as if the killer disclaimed”). 
 86.  See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 6, at 139 (“In the United States, unworthy heirs—
whose conduct bars inheritance—are usually limited to killers.  In nearly all other situations, 
intestate succession is fixed by status: bloodline kinship, marriage, or adoption.  But some 
exceptions for unworthy heirs are developing.”); Anne-Marie Rhodes, Blood and Behavior, 36 AM. 
C. TR. & EST. COUNS. J. 143, 170–75 (2010) (“[L]egislatures responding to public outcry over 
egregious cases have enacted new statutes disinheriting heirs because of their misconduct.  These 
disinheritance statutes generally fall into three categories: slayers, child abandonment, and elder 
abuse.”). 
 87.  DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 6, at 139 (“A handful of states—including California, 
Pennsylvania, and Illinois—have statutes that deny inheritance from children or elderly relatives 
who were abused by the heir.”); see, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 259 (West 2002); OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 112.465 (2015).  Statutes barring inheritance due to abuse often restrict the situations in which 
inheritance barred based upon the vulnerability of the donor.  See Anne-Marie Rhodes, 
Consequences of Heirs’ Misconduct: Moving from Rules to Discretion, 33 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 975, 
986 (2007) (“These specific statutes on abuse distinguish based on the victim, that is, abuse of a 
child and abuse of an adult or elderly decedent . . . .” (footnote omitted)).  For a proposal that spousal 
abuse should bar inheritance, see Carla Spivack, Let’s Get Serious: Spousal Abuse Should Bar 
Inheritance, 90 OR. L. REV. 247 (2011). 
 88.  See Rhodes, supra note 87, at 986 (“The triggering conduct of abuse varies among . . . 
jurisdictions, some including financial exploitation as well as physical abuse.”); see, e.g., ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-456 (2017); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.84.020 (West 2006). 
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slayer rule or the newer statutes that focus on conduct other than killing, have 
become known as “unworthy heirs.”89  Although the rules barring inheritance 
by these unworthy heirs can be characterized as either majoritarian default 
rules or rules that restrict the donor’s freedom of disposition,90 they can also 
be framed as restrictions of live hand control.91  In particular, these rules 
represent restraints of acceptance that limit the donee’s freedom of 
inheritance by requiring them to reject their interest in the donor’s estate. 
2.  Restraints of Rejection 
In contrast to restraints of acceptance, which limit the donee’s ability to 
accept a transfer from the donor, restraints of rejection limit the consequences 
of the donee’s decision to disclaim a transfer.92  Two particular contexts 
illustrate how restraints of rejection operate: (1) a restraint involving an 
insolvent donee; and (2) a restraint involving Medicaid eligibility. 
First, an insolvent donee generally can disclaim a transfer from the 
donor’s estate and prevent their creditors from taking the donor’s property to 
satisfy their debts.93  However, the United States Supreme Court has held that 
a donee cannot disclaim a transfer from the donor’s estate in order to avoid 
federal tax liens.94  In Drye v. United States,95 a donor died leaving $233,000 
to her son.96  Prior to his mother’s death, the son had amassed $325,000 in 
back taxes, and the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) had filed tax liens 
against the son’s property.97  Wanting to avoid the seizure of his mother’s 
property and knowing that his daughter would take the gift if he did not, the 
son disclaimed the transfer from his mother’s estate.98  Recognizing that 
under state law the donee’s disclaimer could remove the donor’s property 
                                                                    
 89.  In re Estate of Haviland, 301 P.3d 31, 41 (Wash. 2013) (Chambers, J., dissenting) (“It is 
plain to me that the true evil the legislature wished to end was elder abuse, not inheritance by 
unworthy heirs.”); DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 6, at 139 (“In the United States, unworthy 
heirs—whose conduct bars inheritance—are usually limited to killers.”); Frances H. Foster, 
Towards a Behavior-Based Model of Inheritance?: The Chinese Experiment, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 77, 80 (1998) (“U.S. legislatures, courts, and scholars have . . . expand[ed] the category of so-
called ‘unworthy heirs’—those heirs whose conduct toward the decedent is deemed so 
‘reprehensible’ that they are disqualified from inheritance.”). 
 90.  See supra notes 77–80 and accompanying text. 
 91.  See supra notes 81–85 and accompanying text. 
 92.  See Weisbord, supra note 16, at 1255 (explaining that “[c]onstraining the power to 
disclaim . . . alters the consequences of a donee’s choice to renounce”). 
 93.  See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 6, at 142. 
 94.  See id. at 142–43; Hirsch, supra note 16, at 1885–87. 
 95.  528 U.S. 49 (1999). 
 96.  Id. at 52–53 (explaining that “$158,000 was personalty and $75,000 was realty located in 
Pulaski County, Arkansas”). 
 97.  Id. at 53. 
 98.  Id. 
  
2020] RESTRAINING LIVE HAND CONTROL OF INHERITANCE 341 
from the reach of ordinary creditors,99 the Supreme Court nevertheless held 
that “the disclaimer did not defeat the federal tax liens.”100 
Although the Court did not prevent the donee from disclaiming his 
interest in the donor’s estate, it did eliminate the benefit that the donee sought 
to enjoy by disclaiming, namely the removal of property from the reach of 
the IRS.  Indeed, after Drye, the IRS can reach property that is in the hands 
of the donee, and it can reach gifted property that is in the hands of others 
because the donee has disclaimed it.  Thus, the holding in Drye does not 
represent an absolute restraint of rejection because the donee maintains the 
ability to disclaim, yet it can still be seen as a restraint of rejection because it 
limits the consequences of the donee’s decision to disclaim. 
The second context in which the law places a restraint of rejection on 
the donee’s freedom of inheritance involves Medicaid eligibility.  Medicaid 
is a governmental assistance program that provides healthcare benefits to 
individuals with limited financial resources.101  To qualify for these benefits, 
an individual must meet certain income and resource qualifications.102  When 
a Medicaid recipient is entitled to a transfer from a donor’s estate, courts have 
grappled with the issue of how the donee’s disclaimer of the transfer should 
affect their Medicaid eligibility.103 
For instance, Troy v. Hart104 involved a Medicaid recipient who was 
entitled to $100,000 from his sister’s estate.105  If the donee accepted the 
transfer, he would have been ineligible for Medicaid, and he would have been 
required to use his inheritance to pay for his medical care.106  However, he 
disclaimed the transfer; the $100,000 was split amongst his surviving sisters; 
and his financial resources remained at a level that qualified him for Medicaid 
assistance.107 
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals found the donee’s exercise of 
freedom of inheritance within this context troubling.  The court admonished 
                                                                    
 99.  Id. (“The disavowing heir’s creditors, Arkansas law provides, may not reach property thus 
disclaimed.”). 
 100.  Id. at 52. 
 101.  See John A. Miller, Medicaid Spend Down, Estate Recovery and Divorce: Doctrine, 
Planning and Policy, 23 ELDER L.J. 41, 46–47 (2015). 
 102.  See id. at 47–56. 
 103.  See Hirsch, supra note 16, at 1897 (“With few exceptions, state courts testing the issue . . . 
have judged disclaimers ineffective to render beneficiaries eligible for Medicaid.  Wherever courts 
have allowed them, state legislators have reacted promptly to overturn the decisions.  No federal 
court has yet spoken to the matter.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 104.  116 Md. App. 468, 697 A.2d 113 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997). 
 105.  Id. at 472, 697 A.2d at 115. 
 106.  See id. at 480, 697 A.2d at 118. 
 107.  See id. at 472–73, 697 A.2d at 115.  Professor Hirsch describes the general scenario of a 
disclaimer affecting Medicaid eligibility: “Medicaid provides medical benefits to citizens in 
financial distress.  An inheritance relieves that distress and can cause a citizen to become ineligible 
for Medicaid.  In turn, a beneficiary might disclaim an inheritance in an effort to maintain his or her 
eligibility.”  Hirsch, supra note 16, at 1896. 
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the use of a disclaimer to maintain Medicaid eligibility by stating: “What is 
ludicrous, if not repugnant, to public policy is that one who is able to regain 
the ability to be financially self-sufficient, albeit for a temporary or even brief 
period of time, may voluntarily relinquish his windfall.”108  To avoid this 
result, the court held, “If a recipient renounces an inheritance that would 
cause him to be financially disqualified from receiving benefits, the 
renunciation should incur the same penalty of disqualification that 
acceptance would have brought about, and should render the recipient liable 
for any payments incorrectly paid by the State in consequence.”109 
While the court did not directly restrain the donee’s freedom of 
inheritance by rendering his disclaimer ineffective, it indirectly imposed a 
restraint of rejection by extinguishing the benefit that he received from 
disclaiming.110  Put simply, the court held that the donee maintains the ability 
to disclaim but the donee’s Medicaid eligibility should be calculated as if 
they had accepted the transfer from the donor’s estate.111  Medicaid eligibility 
therefore represents a second scenario in which the law restrains a donee’s 
freedom of inheritance by limiting the consequences of rejection. 
In sum, although the donee generally enjoys broad freedom of 
inheritance,112 the law restrains this freedom in various ways.  These live 
hand restraints fall within one of two general categories: (1) restraints of 
acceptance; and (2) restraints of rejection.  Restraints of acceptance, such as 
the slayer rule, bar the donee from accepting a gift and therefore require the 
donee to reject a transfer from the donor’s estate.113  By contrast, restraints 
of rejection, such as the rules that prevent the donee from avoiding federal 
tax liens and maintaining Medicaid eligibility by disclaiming a gift, limit the 
                                                                    
 108.  Troy, 116 Md. App at 478, 697 A.2d at 117–18. 
 109.  Id. at 479, 697 A.2d at 118. 
 110.  See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 6, at 157 (“Although the court held the disclaimer 
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 111.  For a list of cases holding similarly, see Hirsch, supra note 16, at 1897 n.134.  See, e.g., In 
re Molloy v. Bane, 631 N.Y.S.2d 910, 911 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (“The instant appeal presents a 
collision of two irreconcilable rules of law.  On the one hand, there is a generally recognized right 
to renounce any and all testamentary or intestate distributions, even when to do so would frustrate 
one’s creditors.  On the other hand, public aid is limited and should be spent only on the truly needy.  
Here, we hold that the policy considerations underlying the latter rule are of paramount importance.  
Accordingly, while one may renounce a testamentary or intestate disposition, such a renunciation is 
not without its consequences for purpose of calculating eligibility for Medicaid.”). 
 112.  See supra Section I.B. 
 113.  See supra notes 70–83 and accompanying text. 
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consequences of the donee’s decision to reject a gift and therefore, make it 
more likely that the donee will accept a transfer from the donor’s estate.114  
Thus, both restraints of acceptance and restraints of rejection limit live hand 
control of inheritance. 
B.  Rationales 
As explained previously, freedom of inheritance promotes the socially 
optimal distribution of property.115  However, under certain conditions, it is 
possible that the donee might exercise their discretion to accept or reject a 
transfer in a way that undermines this social welfare goal.  Therefore, while 
the law generally grants the donee broad freedom of inheritance, it places 
restraints on this freedom that can be characterized as potentially addressing 
three general concerns that might result in the socially suboptimal 
distribution of the donor’s estate: (1) the concern that the donee might not 
accurately assess the benefit of a gift from the donor because of the 
endowment effect;116 (2) the concern that broad freedom of inheritance might 
incentivize socially detrimental behavior;117 and (3) the concern that the 
donee might exercise their freedom of inheritance in a way that produces 
negative externalities.118 
1.  Endowment Effect 
First, some live hand restrictions might be founded upon concerns 
regarding the endowment effect.119  One assumption that underlies the law’s 
grant of freedom of inheritance is that the donee can accurately evaluate the 
utility of either accepting a gift or rejecting it.120  Indeed, the overarching 
rationale of freedom of inheritance holds that with the benefit of the 
information known at the time the donor dies, the donee can compare the 
utility that would be generated from their acceptance of a gift with the utility 
that would result from their rejection of it.121  If the donee decides that they 
will receive utility from the property, then they will accept the gift.122  
Conversely, if the donee decides that the gift would be better placed in the 
hands of an alternate donee, then they will disclaim it.123 
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Although the donee can maximize social welfare by exercising their 
freedom of inheritance, they may not necessarily accurately value the utility 
of a gift.  Due to the psychological phenomenon known as the endowment 
effect, the donee may undervalue the benefit that they will receive from their 
acceptance of the donor’s gift.124  The endowment effect refers to the idea 
that people tend to value things that they possess differently than identical 
things that they do not.125  Specifically, people tend to value property more 
highly when they possess it than when they do not,126 and as a result, they 
typically undervalue property that they do not own.127 
The distorted reasoning that the endowment effect causes might 
interfere with the underlying rationale of freedom of inheritance.  Because 
the donee does not yet possess the property that is the subject of the donor’s 
gift, the donee might underestimate the utility that they would receive from 
accepting the gift.128  If the donee does not accurately assess the relative 
utility of accepting and rejecting a transfer from the donor, then their exercise 
of freedom of inheritance might not increase social welfare, and in fact, it 
might actually decrease social welfare.129  As such, some inheritance 
                                                                    
 124.  See Hirsch, supra note 47, at 152–53. 
 125.  See generally WARD FARNSWORTH, THE LEGAL ANALYST: A TOOLKIT FOR THINKING 
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 126.  See Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 
1228 (2003) (“The much studied ‘endowment effect’ stands for the principal that people tend to 
value goods more when they own them than when they do not.  Move a person from a city house to 
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(footnotes omitted)); Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. 
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 127.  See Charles B. Craver, The Negotiation Process, 27 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 271, 286 (2003) 
(“People who own goods that others wish to purchase tend to overvalue those items, while 
individuals who are thinking of buying goods possessed by others tend to undervalue those items.”); 
Debra Pogrund Stark, et al., Complex Decision-Making and Cognitive Aging Call for Enhanced 
Protection of Seniors Contemplating Reverse Mortgages, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 299, 338 (2014) 
(explaining that “endowment effects” occur when “consumers overvalue things that they already 
own and undervalue things that they do not”). 
 128.  See Hirsch, supra note 47, at 153 (“Because [they have] not yet taken possession, a 
disclaiming beneficiary may well view the transaction not as a (painful) loss, but rather as a 
(relatively painless) forgoing of a gain.  In consequence, the possibility that [they] will disclaim 
without due deliberation looms large[] . . . .” (footnote omitted)); Hirsch, supra note 36, at 36  
(“How might the endowment effect affect the treatment of inherited wealth?  Well, that depends.  If 
the beneficiary fails to conceptualize an inheritance as really being ‘[their]’ property, [they] might 
be less averse to risking or dissipating it . . . .  This phenomenon, I suspect, may help explain the 
high frequency of disclaimers of inheritances.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 129.  See Adam J. Hirsch, Formalizing Gratuitous and Contractual Transfers: A Situational 
Theory, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 797, 834 n.179 (“[D]onors’ rights to future interests and expectancies 
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regulations might be based, in part, upon the idea that the law should not 
defer to the donee’s decision to accept or reject a transfer when their decision-
making process is distorted by the endowment effect. 
Of course, the endowment effect does not provide a full explanation of 
all live hand restrictions.130  Firstly, the endowment effect can only be used 
to justify restraints of rejection, which, as explained previously, limit the 
consequences of the donee’s decision to disclaim a gift.131  The endowment 
effect suggests that the donee will too easily reject a gift because they 
undervalue the benefit of acceptance.132  Restraints of rejection therefore 
directly address the concerns that the endowment effect raises.  By contrast, 
the endowment effect cannot explain restraints of acceptance, which require 
the donee to reject a gift,133 as mandatory rejection does not address concerns 
regarding the donee’s undervaluation of a gift from the donor. 
Secondly, the endowment effect theoretically affects the donee’s ability 
to accurately evaluate the utility of accepting or rejecting a gift in all 
situations.  The law, nevertheless, neither requires the donee to accept all gifts 
nor limits the consequences of the donee’s decision to disclaim in all 
situations.134  Instead, the law generally defers to the donee’s decisions to 
disclaim,135 and its restrictions of live hand control are limited.136  
Consequently, the restraints that the law does place on the live hand cannot 
be explained solely by the endowment effect, and therefore they must be 
founded upon additional policy rationales. 
2.  Incentives 
In addition to the concern that the rationality of the donee’s decision-
making process might be distorted by the endowment effect,137 some 
restraints of live hand control could be founded upon the basis of 
incentivizing socially beneficial behavior.  Under this rationale, a restraint of 
the donee’s freedom of inheritance is designed, not to ensure that the donee’s 
decision maximizes social welfare, but to encourage others to conduct 
themselves in ways that maximize social welfare.  Consider, for example, the 
slayer rule.  As explained previously, the slayer rule prevents a killer from 
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 131.  See supra Section II.A.2. 
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benefiting from their victim’s estate, which means the killer essentially is 
required to disclaim any gift from the slain donor.138  Although this restraint 
of acceptance could be founded upon other rationales,139 it might be designed 
to incentivize socially beneficial conduct. 
In particular, the slayer rule could be designed to deter killings.140  If a 
prospective donee knows they will not benefit from the donor’s estate if they 
were to kill the donor, then the prospective donee might be less likely to 
engage in the slaying.141  As Professor Mary Louise Fellows explains, 
“[D]enying succession rights to slayers . . . reinforces criminal punishments 
for a felonious killing because the denial deters a person from killing to 
succeed to another person’s property.”142  Thus, the slayer rule could be 
justified on the same grounds as the law’s criminal punishment of murder,143 
namely that the killing of another is socially undesirable and consequently 
such behavior should be deterred.144 
In addition to the slayer rule, other restraints of live hand control could 
be justified on the grounds of incentives.  Consider, for instance, the restraint 
of rejection that denies the donee the ability to avoid federal tax liens by 
disclaiming a gift.145  Under a rationale of incentives, a prospective donee 
might be more likely to pay their taxes if they know that the IRS will be able 
to reach gifted property regardless of whether they accept or reject the gift.  
The increased likelihood of voluntary tax compliance is socially beneficial 
                                                                    
 138.  See supra notes 71–84 and accompanying text. 
 139.  See infra notes 193–200 and accompanying text. 
 140.  See Kevin Bennardo, Slaying Contingent Beneficiaries, 24 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 31, 37 
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489, 493 (1986); see Hirsch, supra note 77, at 621 (explaining that deterrence is one policy of the 
slayer rule). 
 143.  See Manuel A. Utset, Digital Surveillance and Preventive Policing, 49 CONN. L. REV. 
1453, 1459–60 (2017) (“Under the economics approach, the goal of the criminal justice system is 
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 144.  See Hirsch, supra note 13, at 2214 (“[B]y insistently rewarding behavior that the state 
deems criminal, the testator’s choice of bequest itself causes social harm, operating perversely to 
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 145.  See supra notes 93–99 and accompanying text. 
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because it reduces the enforcement costs that the government must bear to 
meet its revenue goals.146  Thus, a restraint of live hand control that 
encourages the donee to pay their taxes is socially beneficial. 
However, like the endowment effect,147 several considerations suggest 
that the incentives rationale does not adequately explain the law’s restraints 
of the live hand.  First, for the law to successfully encourage or deter specific 
conduct, those whose behavior the law seeks to influence must be aware of 
the law.148  Whereas other areas of law are squarely concerned with 
deterrence of undesirable conduct,149 inheritance law is not.  As Professor 
Carla Spivack explains, “The primary purpose of wills law . . . is to effectuate 
the testator’s intent . . . .  Unlike criminal law, inheritance law does not serve 
to deter dangerous or violent crimes or other socially disruptive acts.”150  
Because inheritance law is not specifically designed to deter, a donee is less 
likely to understand and consider the consequences of the law’s restraints of 
freedom of inheritance when deciding to engage in the conduct that could 
possibly be deterred by these restraints.151 
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 151.  Several scholars have recognized that the law of succession generally, and specific aspects 
of it, are obscure and not widely known or understood.  See, e.g., Alexander A. Boni-Saenz, 
Distributive Justice and Donative Intent, 65 UCLA L. REV. 324, 338–39 (2018) (“One may have 
the motivation to engage in estate planning but lack the resources to do so effectively . . . .  One 
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Consider, for instance, the slayer rule.152  While most individuals likely 
understand that criminal law imposes penalties on the act of killing, fewer 
likely know that inheritance law also imposes penalties on the same conduct.  
Similarly, one who fails to satisfy their tax obligations to the federal 
government might be aware that such failure has consequences imposed by 
both tax law and criminal law.  It seems much less likely, however, that they 
would independently know that inheritance law imposes additional 
consequences to tax delinquency when a federal lien attaches to their 
property. 
Second, assuming that the donee is aware of the law, live hand restraints 
will not influence the donee’s conduct if they do not consider their 
consequences when making decisions.153  For instance, the effect of the 
slayer rule is to deprive the donee of the economic advantage of killing the 
donor,154 and therefore, to the extent the killer is motivated by monetary 
benefit, the slayer rule could have some deterrent effect.155  However, not all 
killers are motivated by pecuniary gain,156 and in these instances, the loss of 
a monetary benefit likely does not significantly influence the slayer’s 
decision to kill.157 
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While the slayer rule might have some deterrent effect for a prospective 
killer who is motivated by money, the law’s restraint of rejection in the 
context of federal tax liens likely produces an even weaker incentive because 
the inability to disclaim would seem to be of little concern to a donee at the 
time they decide whether to satisfy their tax obligations.  To begin with, the 
inability to disclaim would only affect the donee’s tax payment if they truly 
are deciding whether to pay.  If the donee’s failure to pay tax is due to mistake 
or ignorance of their obligations, then the potential negative consequence of 
restrained freedom of inheritance likely has no effect on the donee’s conduct.  
Likewise, if the donee’s failure to pay is due to financial inability, then the 
threat of attachment of federal tax liens to a future inheritance likely does not 
increase the likelihood of payment.  If, however, the donee is considering 
whether to intentionally evade paying their taxes, then the law’s restraint of 
freedom of inheritance could potentially serve as an incentive to pay. 
Nevertheless, even for a donee who is affirmatively contemplating tax 
evasion, the inability to disclaim an inheritance likely is not a meaningful 
consideration due to the general uncertainty of a future inheritance.  Because 
the donor can change their estate plan at any time during life,158 a prospective 
tax evader has no guarantee that they will be entitled to an inheritance at the 
time of the donor’s death.  The donee’s inheritance therefore remains 
uncertain after the donee’s decision either to pay tax or to evade it.159  
Because a prospective tax evader will not necessarily experience the negative 
consequences of restrained freedom of inheritance, such restraint likely does 
not serve as a meaningful incentive to make tax payments. 
Finally, even if the donee is aware of the law and considers its 
consequences, their conduct will not be significantly influenced by live hand 
restraints if the law imposes other, more effective, disincentives.  In this 
regard, the criminal law already strongly disincentivizes the conduct that is 
the focus of the slayer rule, namely the killing of the donor by the donee.160  
If the donee is not deterred from killing by the threat of extended 
incarceration or even potential execution, then they likely will not be deterred 
by the possibility of losing an inheritance.  Similarly, federal law already 
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disincentivizes the intentional nonpayment of tax by threat of monetary fines 
and imprisonment.161  If one contemplating tax evasion is not deterred by the 
possibility of these criminal sanctions, then they might not be deterred by 
their inability to avoid federal tax liens through the disclaimer of future 
inheritances. 
In sum, although live hand restraints might have some deterrent 
effect,162 the incentives rationale alone does not adequately justify them.  
Some scholars have expressly recognized the subordinate nature of the 
incentives rational in the context of the slayer rule.163  For example, Professor 
Kevin Bennardo explains that one cannot “say that the slayer rule never 
deters,” but “the deterrent effect of the rule is so weak that it cannot and 
should not be the primary justification for the rule.”164  The same 
considerations that indicate deterrence is a collateral consequence and not a 
primary justification of the slayer rule also suggest that an incentives 
rationale is not an adequate justification of other live hand restraints.  Thus, 
the law’s restraints of freedom of inheritance must be founded upon 
additional policy concerns. 
3.  Negative Externalities 
Finally, the law’s restraints of the live hand could be designed to address 
concerns regarding negative externalities.165  The donee’s freedom of 
inheritance is founded upon the rationale that the donee can evaluate the costs 
and benefits of accepting or rejecting a gift from the donor, and the donee 
can make the decision that produces the greatest utility.166  In some situations, 
however, the donee’s decision to accept or reject a gift from the donor 
imposes costs on others that are not borne by the donee.  If the donee does 
not consider these costs, then they will not accurately weigh the costs and 
benefits of their decision, and, consequently, their decision to accept or reject 
a gift might not maximize social welfare. 
The costs of a decision that are not borne by the decisionmaker are 
known as negative externalities, and the paradigmatic example of how 
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slayer rule rather than a policy goal.”). 
 164.  Bennardo, supra note 140, at 40. 
 165.  See infra note 172. 
 166.  See supra Section I.B. 
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negative externalities can render an individual’s decision suboptimal from a 
social welfare standpoint involves pollution.167  When a businessperson 
decides to continue producing goods at their manufacturing plant, they will 
weigh the private costs—namely the costs of labor and materials—with the 
private benefits—specifically the revenue generated from production.168  If 
these private benefits outweigh the private costs, then the businessperson will 
make the decision to continue operations.169 
However, just because the decision to continue production is best for 
the businessperson as an individual does not mean the decision maximizes 
social welfare.  This discrepancy stems from the possibility that the decision 
to continue production might impose costs on others that the businessperson 
does not necessarily factor into their decision.  Specifically, production at the 
manufacturing plant could result in negative externalities in the form of 
pollution.170  When the social costs of pollution are factored into the analysis, 
the socially optimal decision might be to close the manufacturing plant, 
despite the private benefits of production outweighing the private costs.171  
Therefore, as exemplified by the pollution producing business, negative 
externalities can cause socially detrimental activity to occur when individual 
decisionmakers do not internalize all societal costs. 
Like the businessperson’s decision to continue manufacturing 
operations, the donee’s decision to accept or reject a gift from the donor could 
have societal costs that render their decision suboptimal from a social welfare 
                                                                    
 167.  See Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 300 
(2007) (“Environmental pollution is an archetypal example of an externality.  Acme Factory 
produces widgets and in doing so emits pollutants into the environment.  People living downstream 
or downwind from Acme receive the pollutants and bear some costs as a result.  These costs are 
external to Acme’s decision to produce widgets . . . .”). 
 168.  See Daniel B. Kelly, Strategic Spillovers, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1650 (2011) (“In 
deciding whether to open a factory or increase production, a firm will compare its private benefits 
and costs but may ignore the social costs of pollution on local residents, other countries, or future 
generations.”). 
 169.  See id. 
 170.  See id. at 1649–50 (“[S]elf-interested individuals and profit-maximizing firms use their 
property for various purposes, and, in doing so, these individuals and firms may impose external 
effects on others.  That is, a party may undertake an activity that has not only private benefits and 
costs, which directly affect the party engaging in the activity, but also social effects, which affect 
the welfare of other parties.  If these social effects are beneficial, the activity entails positive 
externalities; if these social effects are harmful, the activity entails negative externalities.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 171.  See id. at 1651 (“Operating the factory may be socially undesirable, even if the firm has a 
private incentive to operate the factory, if the social costs of operating the factory, including the 
external costs of the pollution, exceed the social benefits of manufacturing . . . .”).  It is important 
to note that just because an activity produces negative externalities does not mean that the activity 
is socially undesirable.  See id. (“[O]perating the factory may be socially desirable, despite the 
external costs of the pollution, if the social benefits of manufacturing . . . exceed the social costs of 
operating the factory, including the external costs of the pollution.”). 
  
352 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 79:325 
perspective.172  One particular context in which the donor might exercise their 
freedom of inheritance without considering the societal costs of their decision 
involves federal tax liens.  Indeed, a donee’s decision to disclaim gifts in 
order to avoid the federal government’s seizure of the gifted property in 
satisfaction of their tax liabilities might produce negative externalities that 
warrant the law’s restriction of their ability to do so.173  However, before one 
can understand why a donor’s avoidance of federal tax liens through the 
exercise of freedom of inheritance might produce negative externalities, one 
must first understand why the donor’s decision to disclaim property in order 
to avoid the claims of ordinary creditors does not produce negative 
externalities. 
Although the law restricts the donee’s ability to avoid federal tax liens 
through the exercise of freedom of inheritance,174 it allows the donee to 
disclaim gifts to avoid the claims of ordinary creditors.175  The law allows the 
donee to divert gifted property away from ordinary creditors because the 
donee’s decision to do so does not produce negative externalities.  When a 
creditor decides to extend credit, the price it charges reflects the risk of 
default,176 which depends upon a variety of factors including the debtor’s 
credit history, their available resources, and any collateral pledged as 
                                                                    
 172.  See Hirsch, supra note 16, at 1881 (suggesting that federal regulation of the donee’s ability 
to disclaim might be appropriate in instances in which “disclaimers  . . . leave citizens impecunious” 
and consequently “could damage the financial interests of the federal government”); Weisbord, 
supra note 16, at 1252–61 (recognizing harms to governmental interests as potential externalities 
that are addressed by restrictions on the donee’s ability to disclaim to avoid federal tax liens and to 
maintain Medicaid eligibility).  The idea that the donee’s exercise of freedom of inheritance could 
produce negative externalities is an extension of the notion that the donor’s exercise of freedom of 
disposition could do so.  See Glover, supra note 10, at 328 (“[T]he decision-maker, whether the 
donor or the donee, might not make decisions that maximize social welfare, and the law therefore 
restricts both freedom of disposition and freedom of inheritance in ways that are designed to limit 
the negative externalities that are produced by the exercise of these freedoms.”); see also Hirsch, 
supra note 13, at 2204 (“[E]conomic analysis—applicable . . . to . . . freedom of testation—
potentially justifies nullification only of conditions that involve irreversible choices or that entail 
tangible spillover costs.”); Kelly, supra note 1, at 1161 (“Externalities . . . may arise because of a 
disposition of property at death.”); Weisbord, supra note 16, at 1230 (“Mandatory restrictions on 
dispositional freedom are minimal and mostly confined to transfers that generate contexts where 
regulation is necessary to minimize spillover costs or harm to private, non-consenting third 
parties.”). 
 173.  See infra notes 181–185 and accompanying text. 
 174.  See supra notes 93–100 and accompanying text. 
 175.  See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 6, at 142 (“Suppose A disclaims her interest in 
O’s estate.  Most cases have held that A’s ordinary creditors cannot reach the disclaimed property.”). 
 176.  See Hirsch, supra note 16, at 1883 (“Commercial lenders are voluntary creditors.  They 
extend credit to borrowers or offer purchase-money credit fully aware of the risk of incidental 
default—but by maintaining a portfolio of debt, voluntary creditors can spread risk.  The interest 
rates they charge reflect the risk of default, ensuring (within an acceptable margin of error) that they 
will profit in the aggregate.”). 
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security.177  Notably absent from the creditor’s consideration is the donee’s 
inheritance prospects. 
Because it is subject to the whims and solvency of the donor,178 an 
inheritance is so uncertain that a creditor will not consider it as a possible 
source of satisfaction of debts, and the prospect of an inheritance will 
therefore not be reflected in the price of credit.179  As such, the donee’s 
decision to disclaim and shift gifted property away from ordinary creditors 
does not impose a cost upon these creditors because they have been 
compensated for bearing the risk that the donee will inherit nothing from the 
donor.  As Professor Hirsch puts differently, because “[t]he expectancy of 
inheritance [is] not [] reflected in the price of credit,” creditors “would 
receive, literally, more than they bargained for” if they “stood in a position 
to prevent disclaimers by insolvents.”180 
Because freedom of inheritance does not raise negative externality 
concerns for most insolvent donees, the law typically allows the donee to 
reject a transfer from the donor and divert the gift away from their creditors.  
However, one exception to this general rule involves a donee who owes back 
taxes to the federal government.181  As explained previously, the Supreme 
Court has held that, even when the donee effectively exercises their right to 
reject a gift under state law, “the disclaimer d[oes] not defeat . . . federal tax 
liens.”182  Although it did not frame its decision in this way, the Supreme 
Court essentially ruled that federal tax law places a restraint of rejection on 
the donee’s freedom of inheritance that limits the consequences of their 
decision to disclaim. 
                                                                    
 177.  See Hirsch, supra note 5, at 614 (“Consumer credit dossiers normally report the debtor’s 
credit history, income, assets, debts and obligations.  Creditors who finance large purchases 
generally protect themselves by demanding a security interest in collateral and consequently can 
disregard the debtor’s other resources.” (footnote omitted)). 
 178.  See id. at 613 (“A will is ambulatory, and while the life-span of the testator can be 
actuarially estimated, thereby indicating the extent to which interests created under the will must be 
discounted, the probability that the testator will revoke his will before it ‘matures’ depends upon 
idiosyncrasy, and hence is indeterminate.”).  In addition to the uncertainty of an inheritance, other 
considerations might dissuade creditors from considering a debtor’s inheritance prospects.  See id. 
(“Few debtors have the requisite information at their fingertips; efforts to obtain the information 
would be inefficient, significantly increasing transaction costs.”). 
 179.  See Hirsch, supra note 16, at 1883 (“[V]oluntary lenders seldom rely on debtors’ prospects 
of inheritance when they set the price of credit.”); Hirsch, supra note 47, at 158 (“[V]oluntary 
creditors almost certainly will not have relied on a debtor’s prospects of inheritance when they set 
the price of credit.”); Hirsch, supra note 5, at 614. (“[E]vidence indicates that creditors ordinarily 
show little interest in their debtors’ expectancies.”). 
 180.  Hirsch, supra note 5, at 614. 
 181.  See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 6, at 142–43. 
 182.  Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49, 52 (1999); see supra notes 93–100 and accompanying 
text. 
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A potential rationale for this restraint of rejection is that the use of a 
disclaimer to avoid federal tax liens generates negative externalities.183  
Specifically, the donee likely does not consider that their avoidance of federal 
tax liens through their exercise of freedom of inheritance might increase the 
tax burden of all taxpayers.  Professor Hirsch explains that “[t]he federal Joint 
Committee on Taxation takes the incidence of expected tax delinquency into 
account when estimating revenues from a given tax and its rate structure, 
allowing Congress to meet its revenue goals regardless of delinquency.”184  
Under this line of reasoning, when tax authorities have greater ability to 
enforce individual tax obligations, the tax rate can be lowered and revenue 
goals will still be met.  Conversely, when tax authorities have lesser ability 
to enforce individual tax obligations, the tax rate must be raised to meet 
revenue goals. 
If tax rates increase because of donees’ decisions to disclaim 
inheritances, the additional tax liability of others required to meet Congress’s 
revenue goals represents a negative externality flowing from the exercise of 
freedom of inheritance.  Within this context, the prohibition on the use of 
disclaimers to avoid federal tax liens can be seen as an enforcement tool for 
tax authorities that increases the amount of tax collected and therefore 
reduces the tax rate that must be imposed on others.185  Put differently, a 
restraint of live hand control in the context of federal tax liens can be founded 
upon the rationale that it minimizes the costs of the donee’s decision that are 
borne, not by the donee, but by others. 
In addition to the situation in which a donee attempts to avoid federal 
tax liens by disclaiming an inheritance, another situation in which restraint 
of the live hand might be justified on negative externality grounds involves 
Medicaid eligibility.  Medicaid is a governmental assistance program that 
provides healthcare benefits to individuals with limited financial 
resources.186  Because the donee’s Medicaid eligibility is dependent upon 
their ability to pay for their own medical expenses, an inheritance could affect 
their eligibility for assistance.  Indeed, the possibility arises that a donee will 
                                                                    
 183.  See Weisbord, supra note 16, at 1258 (“Tax lien disclaimers undermine the government’s 
financial interest by allowing disclaimants to protect inherited property from tax collection.”). 
 184.  Hirsch, supra note 16, at 1884 (footnote omitted); see JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, ABOUT 
THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION 10, 
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=1174 (last accessed Sept. 5, 2019) 
(“The Joint Committee . . . examine[s] compliance, administration, and enforcement issues that 
could affect the timing or amounts of revenues collected as part of the process of understanding how 
a proposal would operate.  When these issues are likely to be important to a proposal, the Joint 
Committee staff accounts for their effects in the revenue estimate.”). 
 185.  See Bender, supra note 51, at 901 (“When they avoid tax liens, disclaimants frustrate the 
government’s ability to collect outstanding tax obligations.”); Weisbord, supra note 16, at 1259 
(“[T]he failure of state law disclaimer statutes to protect the governmental interest in tax 
collection . . . forced federal courts to find ways to override state wealth transfer law.”). 
 186.  See Miller, supra note 101, at 46–47.  
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maintain Medicaid eligibility if they were to disclaim an inheritance but lose 
eligibility if they were to accept the gift from the donor’s estate.187 
The law generally tolerates broad live hand control of inheritance, but, 
as explained previously, it restricts freedom of inheritance in the context of 
Medicaid eligibility.188  More particularly, it does so indirectly, as the donee 
can reject a gift while receiving Medicaid benefits.189  However, the 
disclaimed property is considered when the donee’s Medicaid eligibility is 
calculated.190  Thus, the law does not directly restrain live hand control in this 
situation because the donee can still decide to reject a gift.  Instead, the law 
indirectly restrains freedom of inheritance by eliminating some of the 
consequences of the donee’s decision to disclaim. 
The rationale underlying this restraint of rejection is similar to the 
rationale of the restraint of the live hand in the context of federal tax liens, as 
both are designed to address a problem of negative externalities.191  As 
explained previously, if donees were able to avoid federal tax liens by 
disclaiming, the general public would have to contribute more in order for 
the government to meet its budgetary goals.192  Likewise, if donees were able 
to maintain Medicaid eligibility by disclaiming, the general public’s tax 
burden would have to increase in order to cover the increased cost of 
Medicaid programs.193  Under either scenario, the cost of the donee’s 
                                                                    
 187.  See Hirsch, supra note 16, at 1896 (“Medicaid provides medical benefits to citizens in 
financial distress.  An inheritance relieves that distress and can cause a citizen to become ineligible 
for Medicaid.  In turn, a beneficiary might disclaim an inheritance in an effort to maintain his or her 
eligibility.”). 
 188.  See supra notes 101–111 and accompanying text. 
 189.  See Hirsch, supra note 16, at 1897 n.110. 
 190.  See id. at 1897 n.134. 
 191.  See id. at 1896 (noting the scenario of a donee disclaiming an inheritance to maintain 
Medicaid eligibility “resembles the problem of disclaimers thwarting the tax commissioner, in that 
they can function to create (as opposed to leave unsatisfied) a government liability.  Either way, 
disclaimers would take a toll on the public fisc”); Weisbord, supra note 16, at 1255 (“Two contexts 
implicate the governmental interest in disclaimer law: (1) where the government provides public 
assistance (Medicaid, in particular) . . . and (2) where a disclaimant has outstanding tax liens . . . . 
Disclaimers [in these contexts] interfere with the government’s allocation and collection of public 
financial resources . . . .” (footnotes omitted)). 
 192.  See supra notes 184–185 and accompanying text. 
 193.  See Hirsch, supra note 5, at 602 (“[D]isclaimer by the devisee would have resulted in her 
continued dependence upon Medicaid payments, whereas ‘the purpose of [Medicaid is] to aid only 
economically disadvantaged persons; the economic viability of the Medicaid program itself can be 
maintained only if eligibility requirements are diligently observed.’” (second alteration in original)); 
Hirsch, supra note 16, at 1898 (“In crafting that law, the rationale for suppression of Medicaid 
planning is clear.  The program exists to benefit the ‘truly needy,’ not those who ‘created their own 
need,’ as one court has put it.  If allowed to determine Medicaid eligibility, disclaimers would 
impose an ‘unnecessar[y] . . . burden’ on taxpayers.” (alteration in original) (footnote omitted)); 
Weisbord, supra note 16, at 1257 (“From the governmental interest perspective, states should be 
proactive in enacting mandatory rules that prohibit Medicaid disclaimers because allowing 
individuals with access to private resources increases the cost of a Medicaid program already 
threatened by the possibility of significant long-term budget cuts.”). 
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decision falls on society as a whole, rather than on the individual 
decisionmaker.  As a result, the donee might not make a decision that 
maximizes social welfare, and the law therefore restricts their ability to 
maintain Medicaid eligibility through the exercise of freedom of inheritance. 
In addition to the restraints of rejection that the law places on the 
donee’s freedom of inheritance, the law’s primary restraint of acceptance, 
known as the slayer rule, could also be founded upon negative externality 
concerns.  As explained above, the slayer rule prevents a donee from 
accepting a gift from a donor whom the donee kills, and it therefore 
essentially requires the slayer to disclaim any interest in their victim’s 
estate.194  Scholars generally do not describe the slayer rule as addressing the 
problem of the donee imposing costs on others,195 but instead they typically 
explain that the slayer rule prevents the killer from enjoying an undeserved 
benefit.  Put differently, the slayer rule is typically explained as preventing 
the killer’s unjust enrichment.196 
Consider, for example, the justification of the slayer rule found in the 
Restatement.  It explains, “The rationale for the slayer rule is the prevention 
of unjust enrichment, in accord with the maxim that a wrongdoer cannot 
profit from [their] wrong.  Any enrichment accruing to a slayer from the 
wrong is unjust and is not allowed.”197  From the Restatement’s perspective, 
the inheritance a slayer receives flows directly from their act of killing, and 
it would therefore be unjust for the slayer to benefit from their wrongful 
                                                                    
 194.  See supra Section II.A.1. 
 195.  In addition to focusing on potential negative externalities generated by the donee’s exercise 
of freedom of inheritance, an analysis of the slayer rule can also focus on potential negative 
externalities generated by the donor’s exercise of freedom of disposition.  See Glover, supra note 
13, at 449. 
 196.  See, e.g., DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 6, at 136 (“The slayer rule . . . is an 
application of the law of restitution and unjust enrichment.”); William M. McGovern, Jr., supra 
note 141, at 65 (“Today, most jurisdictions bar a killer from succeeding to his victim’s property.  
The traditional rationale for that result is that a criminal should not be allowed to enrich himself by 
his crime.”); Doug Rendleman, Restating Restitution: The Restatement and Its Critics, 65 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 933, 937 (2008) (“This blackletter rule is a broad statement that the unjust enrichment 
principle overrides the victim’s testamentary disposition or the intestacy statute in order to prevent 
the slayer from profiting from his wrong.  Today its major point is not controversial.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 197.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.4 cmt. b 
(AM. LAW INST. 2003).  The Uniform Probate Code also suggests that the rationale of the slayer 
rule is founded upon unjust enrichment concerns.  See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-803(f) (NAT’L 
CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2010) (“A wrongful acquisition of property or 
interest by a killer not covered by this section must be treated in accordance with the principle that 
a killer cannot profit from his [or her] wrong.”).  Likewise, the Restatement of Restitution explains 
that the slayer rule prevents unjust enrichment.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 45(2) (AM. LAW. INST. 2011) (“A slayer’s acquisition, enlargement, or 
accelerated possession of an interest in property as a result of the victim’s death constitutes unjust 
enrichment that the slayer will not be allowed to retain.”). 
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conduct.  Consequently, the law prevents the killer from benefiting from their 
victim. 
Unjust enrichment is the typical explanation of the slayer rule, but it is 
not the only conceivable explanation.  Indeed, the slayer rule’s unjust 
enrichment rationale can be reframed as a rationale based upon negative 
externalities.  From this alternate perspective, the slayer’s benefit should not 
be characterized as resulting from their act of killing, but instead it should be 
seen as flowing from the donor’s estate-planning decisions.  After all, if the 
donor did not exercise their freedom of disposition in favor of the slayer, then 
the slayer would receive nothing from the victim’s estate regardless of the 
victim’s cause of death.  When reframed in this way, the problem with the 
slayer’s benefit is not that it is the result of wrongful conduct and therefore 
unjust.198  Instead, the problem is that the slayer’s gift might be contrary to 
the donor’s actual intent.199  The slayer’s act of killing the donor raises 
questions regarding whether the donor truly intended to benefit the slayer 
despite that the intent expressed through their estate-planning decisions 
suggests that they did.200 
More particularly, if the donor had known that the slayer would kill 
them, then the donor might not have made estate-planning decisions that 
benefited the slayer.201  The donor instead might have preferred to benefit 
others.  If the donor indeed did not intend to benefit their killer, then the 
slayer’s acceptance of the gift generates negative externalities because the 
donor’s intended beneficiaries are deprived of the gift.  The deprivation of an 
intended benefit can be seen as a cost of the donee’s exercise of freedom of 
inheritance that is borne by the donor’s intended beneficiaries and not by the 
slayer.  More broadly, the disposition of the donor’s property in ways 
contrary to their intent also imposes costs on society as a whole because the 
law in this area is founded upon the idea that freedom of disposition and, in 
                                                                    
 198.  See Sherman, supra note 156, at 861 (“When one examines the[] . . . untoward effects 
produced by a slayer’s actions, one sees that they are not morally objectionable except insofar as 
they frustrate intentions we are otherwise disposed to honor.”). 
 199.  See Fellows, supra note 142, at 493–94 (“Only if the law denies slayers the right to succeed 
to their victims’ property can the law ameliorate potential disruptions to property transfers and 
protect donative freedom . . . .”); Sherman, supra note 156, at 860–62 (“[T]he [slayer] rule is 
designed to preserve the integrity of our property-transfer system by preventing a person from 
altering, by means of a wrongful slaying, the course of property succession as intended by the source 
of the property. . . . In other words, [the donor’s] intent is the key.”). 
 200.  See Cohen, supra note 140, at 799 (“The murderer’s illegal act creates an extreme change 
of circumstances regarding the order of succession.  The testator’s intention to benefit the slayer . . . 
now seems detached from reality.  Another distribution of assets is needed.” (footnote omitted)); 
Simmons, supra note 77, at 131 (“Legislators might reasonably assume that most people would not 
desire that their killer inherit part or all of their estate.”). 
 201.  See Hirsch, supra note 13, at 2214 (explaining that the slayer rule “adjusts the estate plan 
to the probable intent of the victim in most instances, for testators rarely wish to provide for their 
assassins; only the speed of the assault typically stymies formal disinheritance of the slayer”). 
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turn, fulfillment of the donor’s intent, is socially beneficial.202  Thus, when 
framed in this way, the slayer rule can be characterized, not as preventing the 
unjust enrichment of the slayer, but as minimizing the costs imposed on the 
donor’s intended beneficiaries and upon society as a whole. 
In sum, the law grants the donee freedom of inheritance because the 
donee’s ability to decide for themselves whether to accept or reject a gift is 
seen as maximizing social welfare.203  Nonetheless, the law restrains the live 
hand in certain circumstances,204 and, like the law’s general deference to live 
hand control, these restrictions can be analyzed from a social welfare 
perspective.205  In this regard, the law’s live hand restraints can be seen as 
limiting freedom of inheritance in situations that raise particular concerns 
regarding the donee’s ability to evaluate the costs and benefits of their 
decision to accept or reject a gift.  In particular, the law’s restraints of 
freedom of inheritance primarily can be seen as addressing concerns 
regarding negative externalities.206  Additionally, some of the law’s restraints 
of live hand control could also have collateral consequences that are socially 
desirable, such as combatting the endowment effect and incentivizing 
socially beneficial behavior.207  From this perspective, the law’s restraints of 
freedom of inheritance can be viewed as mechanisms that maximize social 
welfare. 
III.  INCONSISTENCY IN THE DEGREE OF RESTRAINT 
Two important observations should be gleaned from the foregoing 
social welfare analysis of the law’s live hand restraints.  First, both the law’s 
restraints of acceptance and its restraints of rejection are primarily justified 
as minimizing negative externalities.208  Under this rationale, the donee 
should not be able to decide whether to accept a gift or to reject it when such 
a decision imposes costs on others that the donee likely does not consider 
when making their decision.209  If the donee does not consider all of the costs 
that their exercise of freedom of inheritance might generate, then the law 
should not presume that the donee will make decisions that maximize social 
welfare and therefore restraint of live hand control is warranted. 
While this first important takeaway focuses on the similarities between 
the law’s restraints of acceptance and its restraints of rejection, the second 
focuses on inconsistencies between the two, specifically in the degree to 
                                                                    
 202.  See supra Section I.A. 
 203.  See supra Section I.B. 
 204.  See supra Section II.A. 
 205.  See supra Section II.B. 
 206.  See supra Section II.B.3. 
 207.  See supra Sections II.B.1–2. 
 208.  See supra Section II.B. 
 209.  See supra Section II.B.3. 
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which they restrain live hand control.  Although all live hand restraints 
primarily pursue the same policy objectives, the way in which the law 
implements restraints of acceptance differs significantly from the way in 
which it implements restraints of rejection.  On the one hand, the law’s 
restraints of rejection leave the donee’s freedom of inheritance largely intact 
but place limited restraints on the donee’s ability to disclaim that are precisely 
designed to address negative externality concerns.210  On the other hand, the 
law’s traditional restraint of acceptance, namely the slayer rule, broadly 
limits the donee’s freedom of inheritance by completely denying the donee 
the ability to accept a gift.211  In other words, the law’s restraints of rejection 
are partial, but the law’s primary restraint of acceptance is absolute. 
A.  Partial Restraints 
Partial restraints of rejection maximize social welfare because they are 
narrowly tailored to maintain the donee’s freedom of inheritance while at the 
same time minimizing negative externalities.  Consider the law’s restraints 
of rejection that limit the donee’s ability to disclaim to avoid federal tax liens 
and to maintain Medicaid eligibility.212  In both contexts, the donee’s 
rejection of a gift imposes costs on taxpayers who must contribute more in 
order for the government to meet its budgetary goals.213  Despite this 
possibility of negative externalities, the law does not absolutely bar the donee 
from disclaiming.  Instead, the donee can exercise their freedom of 
inheritance by rejecting the gift, but the consequences of that decision are 
altered to address the externality concerns.214 
For example, when the donee’s property is subject to federal tax liens, 
the law allows the donee to disclaim their interest in the donor’s estate, but 
the liens remain with the disclaimed property.215  Because the donee’s 
disclaimer does not affect federal tax liens, the IRS can seek recourse for the 
donee’s unpaid taxes from property that is not owned by the donee.216  This 
partial restraint of rejection maximizes social welfare because it is 
specifically designed to address negative externality concerns while leaving 
the donee’s freedom of inheritance otherwise intact. 
                                                                    
 210.  See supra Sections II.A.2, II.B.3. 
 211.  See supra Section II.A.1. 
 212.  See supra notes 93–111 and accompanying text. 
 213.  See Hirsch, supra note 16, at 1898; Weisbord, supra note 16, at 1252–61. 
 214.  See supra Section II.A.2. 
 215.  See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 6, at 142–43; Hirsch, supra note 16, at 1885–87. 
 216.  See Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., Nationwide Uniformity and the Common Law of Federal 
Taxation, 66 TAX LAW. 1, 47 (2012) (summarizing the holding in Drye and stating “[e]ven though 
the heir never owned the disclaimed inheritance so far as creditors were concerned under state law, 
the Court ruled that the Service was entitled to the property in preference to the recipients under the 
disclaimer”). 
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Imagine a scenario in which the donee’s outstanding tax liability is 
$100,000, and the IRS has levied tax liens against the donee’s property.  If 
the donor dies leaving $50,000 to the donee, the law’s restraint of rejection 
is effectively absolute because the IRS can seek satisfaction of the donee’s 
outstanding tax liability up to the full amount of the gifted property regardless 
of whether the donee accepts or rejects the gift.  Under either scenario, the 
gifted property is subject to the IRS’s claims, and the property will benefit 
neither the donee nor the alternate donee.  This result maximizes social 
welfare because the potential cost imposed on the tax paying public by the 
donee’s decision to disclaim is equal to the amount of the gifted property. 
By contrast, if instead of leaving the donee $50,000, the donor leaves 
the donee $200,000, then the donee has a real choice whether to accept or 
reject a portion of the gift.  If the donee accepts the gift, the IRS can seek 
recourse for the $100,000 tax liability from the accepted property, but the 
donee is left with the remaining $100,000.  Likewise, if the donee rejects the 
gift, the IRS can seek recourse from the property up to the $100,000 tax 
liability, but the alternate donee is left with $100,000 after the IRS exercises 
its remedies.  Thus, the IRS’s ability to seek recourse for the donee’s 
outstanding tax liability against gifted property regardless of whether the 
donee accepts or rejects the gift addresses negative externality concerns, but 
the donee retains the ability to exercise freedom of inheritance over property 
above and beyond their tax delinquency.  By maintaining the donee’s 
freedom of inheritance in this partially restrained fashion, the law allows the 
donee to make the decision to accept or reject at least a portion of the gifted 
property. 
Similarly, when the donee is eligible for Medicaid benefits, the law 
allows the donee to disclaim gifts from the donor’s estate, but if the donee 
does in fact disclaim those gifts, their Medicaid eligibility is calculated as if 
they accepted the gift.217  Thus, like the IRS can seek recourse from 
disclaimed property owned by someone other than the donee when that 
property is subject to federal tax liens, disclaimed property that is not owned 
by the donee can affect the donee’s eligibility for Medicaid assistance.218  
This partial restraint of rejection increases social welfare because it largely 
leaves the donee’s freedom of inheritance in place while at the same time 
addressing negative externality concerns.  Because the donee’s Medicaid 
eligibility is affected regardless of whether the donee accepts or rejects the 
gift, their decision to disclaim will not require the taxpaying public to 
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contribute more to fund Medicaid programs.219  Moreover, after considering 
the effect of the gifted property on their Medicaid eligibility, the donee can 
evaluate whether they or the alternate donee will receive greater utility from 
gifted property. 
In sum, the law’s restraints of rejection are not absolute.  In the contexts 
described above, the donee can exercise freedom of inheritance by 
disclaiming their interest in the donor’s estate, but the law places partial 
restraints of rejection that alter the consequences of the donee’s decision.  
These alterations to the effect of a disclaimer specifically address negative 
externality concerns, and the donee’s freedom of inheritance remains 
otherwise intact.  In this way, partial restraints of rejection maximize social 
welfare. 
B.  Absolute Restraints 
The limited nature of the law’s restraints of rejection stands in stark 
contrast to the absoluteness of its restraint of acceptance in the context of a 
murderous donee.  As explained previously, the law’s primary restraint of 
acceptance is the slayer rule, which prohibits a donee who intentionally kills 
the donor from benefiting from the donor’s estate.220  Like the law’s restraints 
of rejection, this restraint of acceptance primarily is designed to minimize 
negative externalities.221  However, unlike the law’s restraints of rejection, 
the traditional slayer rule is absolute, denying the donee the freedom to accept 
in all situations in which the donee intentionally kills the donor.  Once the 
absolute character of the slayer rule is recognized, the issue becomes whether 
an absolute restraint of acceptance can be justified upon externality concerns. 
The externalities that the slayer rule attempts to avoid stem from the 
probable intent of the donor.222  Although the donor made estate-planning 
decisions that benefited their killer, the donor might have preferred to benefit 
others had the donor known that their chosen beneficiary would kill them.223  
If the donor would have preferred to benefit beneficiaries other than their 
killer, the killer’s exercise of freedom of inheritance by accepting the gift 
from their victim deprives the donor’s intended beneficiaries of a portion of 
their estate.  The deprivation of an intended beneficiary’s gift represents a 
cost of the killer’s decision to accept a gift from their victim that is borne by 
the donor’s intended beneficiary.224  More broadly, by undermining the 
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donor’s freedom of disposition, the donee’s decision to accept in this context 
also imposes costs on society as a whole because the societal benefit of 
honoring the donor’s intent is not realized.225 
Thus, whether the killer’s acceptance of a gift from their victim 
generates negative externalities depends upon the donor’s probable intent.  If 
the donor did not intend their killer to take a portion of their estate, then the 
killer’s acceptance of the gift produces negative externalities.  Alternatively, 
if the donor intended to benefit their killer despite the killer’s wrongdoing, 
the killer’s acceptance of the gift does not produce negative externalities.  
Nevertheless, the application of the traditional slayer rule does not depend 
upon the donor’s intent; it simply applies to all situations in which the donee 
intentionally kills the donor, regardless of what the circumstances suggest 
about the donor’s intent to benefit their killer.226  Indeed, in the vast majority 
of states, the slayer rule is absolute, barring the donee from taking even if the 
donor expressly provides in their will that the donee should take in the event 
that the donee kills them.227 
Proponents of the mandatory nature of the slayer rule might argue that 
the vast majority of donors do not want their killers to benefit from their 
estates, and therefore a broad prohibition of killers taking from their victims 
is justified.  The suggestion that the slayer rule reflects majoritarian 
preferences is likely correct,228 but the suggestion that it reflects a universal 
preference is undoubtedly false.  Although they are the exception, some 
donors likely want to benefit their killers.229  Yet, under the traditional law, 
the killer is barred from accepting the gift in all situations, even those 
                                                                    
 225.  See supra Section I.A. 
 226.  See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 6, at 137. 
 227.  See id. 
 228.  See Simmons, supra note 77, at 131. 
 229.  See Ryan Konsdorf & Scott Alden Prulhiere, Killing Your Chances of Inheriting: The 
Problem with the Application of the Slayer Statute to Cases of Assisted Suicide, 39 AM. C. TR. & 
EST. COUNS. L.J. 399, 413 (2013) (“One of the . . . main purposes behind the slayer statute is the 
presumption that a deceased testator would most likely not wish or intend for the murderous actor 
to continue to inherit, either by intestacy or by will.  This is a logical presumption and one that 
would seem to apply in most, if not all, cases of a murdered testator.  However, this presumption 
does not hold weight when the factual circumstances of a particular case shift from that of a murder 
to that of assisted suicide.”); Spivack, supra note 16, at 160–62 (suggesting situations in which “it 
seems less than clear that the victim’s intent would necessarily be to disinherit the killer,” 
specifically those involving killings between family members).  Even if proponents of a mandatory 
slayer rule concede that some donors intend to benefit their killers, they might still argue that 
restraint of the killer’s freedom of inheritance is warranted because the killer’s intended benefit is 
accelerated.  See Monopoli, supra note 141, at 275 (“Society does not want to encourage people to 
kill to accelerate their inheritances.”).  If the donor does not intend their killer to receive an 
accelerated benefit, then a restraint of acceptance might be warranted in this context.  However, if 
the donor intends their killer to benefit despite the killer’s act of killing, then the donor also likely 
understands that the killer’s benefit is accelerated by the act of killing, and consequently the donor 
likely also intends the killer to receive the accelerated benefit. 
  
2020] RESTRAINING LIVE HAND CONTROL OF INHERITANCE 363 
situations that present no negative externality concerns because the donor 
intends to benefit the killer.230 
Therefore, unlike the law’s partial restraints of rejection, which are 
narrowly tailored to address the problem of negative externalities,231 the 
traditional slayer rule is overly broad because it restrains the exercise of 
freedom of inheritance in situations that do not raise negative externality 
concerns.  The overinclusiveness of this live hand restraint is socially 
detrimental because it forestalls the beneficial exercise of freedom of 
inheritance in situations in which the donor truly intended to benefit their 
killer.  Thus, although the slayer rule can be explained as preventing a 
murderous donee from making decisions that generate negative externalities, 
a closer analysis reveals that this rationale does not justify the rule’s universal 
application and that social welfare might be maximized through reforms that 
permit a killer to inherit from their victim in some situations. 
IV.  HARMONIZING RESTRAINTS THROUGH REFORM 
This Article’s comparative analysis of the law’s restraints of acceptance 
and its restraints of rejection suggests that the slayer rule should not be a 
mandatory rule that prevents the slayer from taking from their victim’s estate 
in all cases.  Instead, it suggests that the slayer rule should be changed from 
a mandatory rule to a default rule.  Because most people would not want their 
killers to benefit from their estates, the law should presume that slayers are 
barred from inheriting from their victims.232  However, no externalities are 
generated from the slayer’s exercise of freedom of inheritance in situations 
where the victim intended the slayer to exercise such freedom.233  
Consequently, the rule should not bar inheritance by the slayer when the 
decedent intended the killer to inherit despite the killer’s conduct.234  
Although a social welfare analysis suggests that the slayer rule should be a 
default rule, questions remain regarding how the law should identify the 
donor’s intent to opt out of the rule’s application. 
Professor Jeffrey Sherman has proposed one possible method for 
identifying the donor’s intent that their killer should inherit.  Specifically, he 
argued that a killer should take from their victim’s estate when objective 
evidence suggests that the donor’s death was the result of a mercy killing.235  
As Professor Sherman summarizes: 
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 Sometimes killing can be a kindness and death a consummation 
devoutly to be wished.  While the retributive purposes of the 
criminal law may be well served by continuing to punish mercy 
killings and assisted suicides, the dispositive purposes of the slayer 
rule are not well served by applying it in those instances.  An 
exception to the slayer rule should [therefore] be found whenever 
the slaying was an assisted suicide or was carried out to relieve the 
suffering of one afflicted with a permanent and incurable illness 
that would ultimately have caused his death or with a permanent 
and irreversible incapacity that imposed severe physiological or 
psychological pain on the victim.236 
In addition to Professor Sherman’s proposal that focuses on mercy 
killings, the slayer statutes in the two states that allow the donor to opt out of 
the rule provide other possible ways in which the donor’s intent can be 
identified.237  One of these allows the killer to inherit only under limited 
circumstances.  In particular, Louisiana’s slayer rule does not bar the killer 
from taking if the killer “proves reconciliation with or forgiveness by the 
decedent.”238  This language would seem to limit a killer’s ability to inherit 
from their victim to situations in which the killer mortally wounds the donor 
but the donor forgives the beneficiary’s conduct prior to death.239 
Wisconsin, the other state that allows a decedent to opt out of the slayer 
rule, provides two additional methods for identifying the donor’s intent.240  
First, a killer can inherit from their victim if “[t]he court finds that, under the 
factual situation created by the killing, the decedent’s wishes would best be 
carried out by means of another disposition of the property.”241  Second, 
Wisconsin’s slayer rule does not bar a killer from inheriting if the victim 
“provide[s] in . . . [their] will, . . . that th[e] [rule] does not apply.”242  Thus, 
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Wisconsin’s probate courts can identify the donor’s intent to benefit their 
killer by either looking for an express statement in the donor’s will or by 
considering any extrinsic evidence of the donor’s intent. 
As Professor Sherman’s proposal and the Louisiana and Wisconsin 
statutes illustrate, a donor’s ability to opt out of the slayer rule is broadened 
or narrowed depending on the type of evidence that a probate court can 
consider.  The narrowest default slayer rule would allow the donor to opt out 
only by an express provision in their will.243  Under this approach, the probate 
court could not look beyond the four corners of the donor’s will to identify 
any intent that the donor’s killer should inherit.  The broadest default slayer 
rule would not prescribe how the donor can communicate their intent but 
would instead allow the probate court to consider any evidence of the donor’s 
intent to opt out of the rule’s application.244 
Between these two extremes lie methods of identifying the donor’s 
intent to opt out of the slayer rule that require the court to consider specific 
extrinsic evidence.  Louisiana’s slayer rule is one example of this middle 
ground approach in that the killer cannot establish the victim’s intent by any 
and all evidence; instead, the killer must present evidence that specifically 
establishes forgiveness by or reconciliation with the decedent.245  Likewise, 
under Sherman’s mercy killing exception, the killer inherits only if the 
donor’s intent is established through circumstantial evidence regarding the 
manner of the donor’s death.246  Under both of these approaches, only 
extrinsic evidence of a specific type can establish the donor’s intent to opt 
out of the slayer rule’s operation. 
Recognizing that probate courts can consider various types of evidence 
of the donor’s intent leads to the question of which method will maximize 
social welfare.  Two variables should be considered when deciding which 
method of identifying the donor’s intent should be used in the context of the 
slayer rule: (1) accuracy and (2) efficiency.  First, because the law of 
succession’s primary goal is to carry out the donor’s intended estate plan, the 
law should strive to make accurate determinations of that intent.247  A 
mandatory slayer rule is undoubtedly deficient in this regard because the 
donor cannot opt out of its application.248  In every case that a donor prefers 
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to benefit their killer, the traditional slayer rule reaches the incorrect 
outcome.249 
Second, the law should strive to make efficient determinations of the 
donor’s intent to opt out of the slayer rule.250  The probate system’s task of 
carrying out the donor’s intended estate plan can generate decision costs 
because when questions arise regarding the donor’s intent, they must be 
litigated.  Consequently, the court and interested parties must expend time, 
money, and effort producing and considering evidence in order to answer 
these questions.251  Social welfare is maximized by a default slayer rule only 
if the benefits of increased accuracy regarding the donor’s intent outweigh 
the decision costs of making more accurate determinations of intent.252  If the 
costs of determining the donor’s intent to opt out of the slayer rule outweigh 
the benefit of increased accuracy, then a default rule will not maximize social 
welfare. 
Although the traditional slayer rule does not always result in accurate 
determinations of the donor’s intent,253 it does minimize the decision costs 
associated with such determinations.  Because the traditional slayer rule is 
mandatory, the parties need not produce and the probate court will never 
consider evidence that might suggest the donor intended to opt out of the 
                                                                    
 249.  See supra notes 228–230 and accompanying text. 
 250.  See Peter T. Wendel, Wills Act Compliance and the Harmless Error Approach: Flawed 
Narrative Equals Flawed Analysis?, 95 OR. L. REV. 337, 382 (2017) (explaining “that one of the 
important public policy considerations . . . is . . . the costs of administration associated with 
ascertaining and giving effect to testator’s intent”); see also Adam J. Hirsch, Testation and the Mind, 
74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 285, 367 (2017) (“Like other landscapes, the legal landscape is an 
environment of scarce resources.  The success and even wisdom of a rule depends in no small 
measure on its frugality.”). 
 251.  See Adam M. Samaha, Undue Process, 59 STAN. L. REV. 601, 616 (2006) (“‘Decision 
costs’ . . . means any burden, such as a resource expenditure or opportunity cost, associated with 
reaching decision.  This covers time, money, and emotional distress from uncertainty, conflict, 
worry, and the like.  And it reaches everyone who bears these costs, whether public or private 
actors.” (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted)); Adrian Vermeule, Interpretative Choice, 75 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 111 (2000) (“‘Decision costs’ is a broad rubric that might encompass direct 
(out-of-pocket) costs of litigation to litigants and the judicial bureaucracy, including the costs of 
supplying judges with information needed to decide the case at hand and formulate doctrines to 
govern future cases; the opportunity costs of litigation to litigants and judges (that is, the time spent 
on a case that could be spent on other cases); and the costs to lower courts of implementing and 
applying doctrines developed at higher levels.”).  The emotional cost of probate litigation may be 
particularly high because the process occurs “during a time when [the parties] are still grieving the 
loss of a loved one.”  Mark Glover, The Therapeutic Function of Testamentary Formality, 61 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 139, 146 (2012). 
 252.  The same type of analysis has been suggested in the context of will-authentication.  See 
James Lindgren, The Fall of Formalism, 55 ALB. L. REV. 1009, 1033 (1992) (“[W]e should ask . . . 
whether [a method of will-authentication] promotes the intent of the testator at an acceptable 
administrative cost.”); Wendel, supra note 250, at 390 (“The challenge in creating and applying a 
Wills Act is how to balance the competing public policy considerations of testator’s intent, costs of 
administration, and potential for misconduct.”). 
 253.  See supra notes 248–249 and accompanying text. 
  
2020] RESTRAINING LIVE HAND CONTROL OF INHERITANCE 367 
rule.254  Thus, a mandatory slayer rule is relatively easy for probate courts to 
apply.  But again, this does not mean that such a rule maximizes social 
welfare.  As previously explained, a default slayer rule will maximize social 
welfare if more accurate outcomes regarding the donor’s intent to benefit 
their killer can be reached without generating offsetting decision costs. 
Professor Sherman did not expressly frame his analysis of the slayer rule 
in this way, but he intuitively understood that the different methods by which 
probate courts can identify the donor’s intent might affect social welfare to 
varying degrees.  In particular, when advocating for his proposed mercy 
killing exception, Professor Sherman rejected Louisiana’s approach to the 
slayer rule because of the difficulties of assessing evidence of forgiveness or 
reconciliation.255  He explained, “[T]he slayer rule should [not] be 
disregarded whenever the victim has ‘forgiven’ the slayer.  Evidence of the 
victim’s forgiveness may be too easily manufactured or the forgiveness itself 
coerced.”256  These problems that Professor Sherman identified with an 
approach to opting out of the slayer rule that focuses on the donor’s 
forgiveness fit squarely within this Article’s social welfare framework. 
With respect to accuracy, Professor Sherman seems to have recognized 
that determining the donor’s subjective intent is a difficult task.  For instance, 
he suggests that probate courts should not be concerned with the issue of the 
donor’s forgiveness because evidence of this subjective issue has an 
increased risk of being “manufactured.”257  Although Professor Sherman 
does not fully explain his concerns, the problem could be that any suggestion 
that the donor spoke forgivingly of their slayer or made any type of 
sympathetic gesture toward them could be used to establish the donor’s 
forgiveness.  As Professor Sherman suggests, this type of evidence could be 
fabricated with the intent to mislead the probate court, or it could also be 
innocently introduced but equivocal in nature.258  If probate courts rely on 
spurious or ambiguous claims of reconciliation, then they will make incorrect 
determinations of the donor’s intent, and social welfare will be decreased 
because the accuracy of the probate process is diminished. 
The difficulty in determining subjective issues of intent, such as whether 
the donor forgave their killer, is exacerbated by the reality that probate courts 
are charged with determining the intent of someone who is inevitably dead.  
Because probate occurs after the donor’s death,259 the best evidence of the 
donor’s intent is unavailable, as the donor cannot simply appear in court and 
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testify regarding what they intended.260  Because the donor is dead, they 
cannot provide context to the statements or actions that are introduced as 
evidence of their intent, and as such, there is no assurance that probate courts 
can accurately make determinations of the donor’s subjective intent.261 
The same criticism that Professor Sherman levied against Louisiana’s 
approach to the slayer rule can be directed toward one of Wisconsin’s 
approaches.  Whereas Louisiana directs probate courts to focus solely upon 
evidence of forgiveness,262 Wisconsin allows courts to consider any and all 
evidence of the donor’s intent to opt out the slayer rule.263  By expanding the 
scope of evidence that courts can consider, the Wisconsin approach presents 
an even greater possibility for ambiguous or manufactured evidence of the 
donor’s subjective intent.  With this authority to assess a potentially broad 
and contradictory collection of evidence, Wisconsin’s probate courts might 
exercise their discretion incorrectly and determine that slayers should inherit 
when in reality their victims intended them to be barred from taking. 
In addition to accuracy, efficiency is the second consideration that 
should inform how the law identifies the donor’s intent to opt out of the slayer 
rule.  As explained above, the task of making accurate determinations of the 
donor’s intent can be costly, as the parties and the court must produce and 
assess relevant evidence.264  A default slayer rule will maximize social 
welfare only if the benefits of making accurate determinations of the donor’s 
intent outweigh the costs of making those determinations.  While Professor 
Sherman’s critique of Louisiana’s forgiveness exception to the slayer rule 
raises concerns regarding accuracy,265 it also raises efficiency concerns. 
In particular, the risk that evidence of forgiveness can be readily 
manufactured may lead to higher rates of litigation regarding the donor’s 
intent.  With the opportunity to present any evidence of the donor’s 
forgiveness, killers might fabricate such evidence, thereby inflating the 
number of disputes that probate courts must resolve.  Similar concerns 
regarding increased litigation rates arise when one considers Wisconsin’s 
approach that allows probate courts to consider, not just evidence of 
forgiveness, but any extrinsic evidence of the donor’s intent.266  Under this 
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approach, the possibility of increased litigation rates stems not only from the 
opportunity for manufactured evidence but also from the reality that some 
legitimate evidence might exist in many cases.  Killers would likely present 
evidence of any stray comment or act by their victim that could conceivably 
suggest the slayer rule should not apply.  By opening the door for courts to 
consider the donor’s subjective intent in these ways, Louisiana’s and 
Wisconsin’s approach to the slayer rule run the risk of increasing litigation 
rates, which in turn raises concerns that a default slayer rule does not 
maximize social welfare.267 
Because of the difficulties of accurately and efficiently deciding issues 
regarding the donor’s subjective intent, the law sometimes directs probate 
courts to decide objective issues that serve as proxies for the donor’s intent.268  
For example, the law of most states does not task probate courts with 
determining whether a donor subjectively intended a particular document to 
constitute a legally effective will; instead, the conventional law directs courts 
to consider the objective issue of whether the donor complied with prescribed 
will-execution formalities.269  Although the particularities of these 
formalities vary from state to state, they generally require that a will be 
written, signed by the donor, and attested by two witnesses.270  If the probate 
court determines that a will complies with these formalities, the law presumes 
that the donor intended the will to be legally effective,271 and if the court 
decides that the will does not comply, the law presumes that the donor did 
not intend the will to be legally effective.272  In short, the law substitutes the 
objective issue of formal compliance for the subjective issue of the donor’s 
intent.273 
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 272.  See id. at 489 (“[O]nce a formal defect is found, Anglo-American courts . . . conclud[e] 
that the attempted will fails.”). 
 273.  See Kevin Bennardo & Mark Glover, The Location of Holographic Wills, 97 N.C. L. REV. 
1625, 1649–50 (2019). 
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This type of substitution, one that replaces a subjective issue of intent 
with an objective factual issue, simplifies the probate court’s task.  Whereas 
deciding issues of testamentary intent are relatively difficult because direct 
observation of one’s subjective intent is impossible,274 and because the 
testator is unavailable to testify regarding their intent,275 factual 
determinations are typically easier for probate courts to decide.276  For 
instance, when a probate court focuses on the testator’s compliance with will-
execution formalities, they need not consider any and all evidence that might 
be relevant to the testator’s intent that a will be legally effective, but instead 
the court must simply look to the face of the will and determine the factual 
issue of whether the will satisfies the formal requirements.  This focus, not 
on subjective intent, but on objective fact, makes the court’s task easier,277 
and it minimizes the expense of making accurate decisions regarding 
testamentary intent.278 
Again, although Professor Sherman did not expressly frame his mercy 
killing exception within this Article’s framework, he understood the potential 
benefit of directing courts to consider an objective proxy of the donor’s 
intent, rather than directing the probate court to directly decide the subjective 
issue of intent.  He explains, “The proposed [mercy killing] exception is . . . 
                                                                    
 274.  See Mary Louise Fellows, In Search of Donative Intent, 73 IOWA L. REV. 611, 656 (1988) 
(referencing “the impossible search for subjective intent”); Jan Klabbers, How to Defeat a Treaty’s 
Object and Purpose Pending Entry Into Force: Toward Manifest Intent, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L 
L. 283, 303 (2001) (“[A]s a philosophical truism, it may be well-nigh impossible to identify 
someone else’s subjective intent; to paraphrase an ancient maxim, not even the devil knows what is 
inside a man’s head.”). 
 275.  See supra note 260 and accompanying text. 
 276.  See Hirsch, supra note 250, at 363–64 (“Thoughts cost more than a proverbial penny, but 
so too do other items of evidence.  Lawmakers can compare recourse to an external standard with a 
related state-of-mind rule and decide which provides greater value (i.e., accuracy) for money. . . . 
When might we expect a state-of-mind rule to prove comparatively efficient?  The question could 
hinge on the scope of the factual inquiry required to carry out objective policy.  Where that inquiry 
is narrow, an external standard becomes more reliable and cheaper to apply.”). 
 277.  See Langbein, supra note 271, at 494 (“Compliance with the Wills Act formalities for 
executing witnessed wills results in considerable uniformity in the organization, language, and 
content of most wills.  Courts are seldom left to puzzle whether the document was meant to be a 
will.” (footnote omitted)); James Lindgren, Abolishing the Attestation Requirement for Wills, 68 
N.C. L. REV. 541, 544 (1990) (“[F]ormalities channel almost all wills into the same patterns, letting 
well-counseled testators know what they must do to execute a valid will, reducing the administrative 
costs of determining which documents are wills, and thus increasing the reliability of our system of 
testation.”); see also Mark Glover, Decoupling the Law of Will-Execution, 88 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 
597, 630 (2014) (“This standardization is a product of the strict compliance requirement, which 
requires the court to indiscriminately invalidate all formally deficient documents.”). 
 278.  See Hirsch, supra note 129, at 804 (“In economic terms, . . . we can justify the imposition 
of expensive formalities on parties as functioning to avoid spillover costs—internalizing the 
negative externality created by state-supported construction proceedings for transfers formulated in 
ambiguous ways.”); David Horton, Tomorrow’s Inheritance: The Frontiers of Estate Planning 
Formalism, 58 B.C. L. REV. 539, 577 (2017) (“[T]he need to prevent spillover costs—not the desire 
to carry out the decedent’s intent—furnishes the most forceful reasons to take the Wills Act at its 
letter.”). 
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confined to cases where the inference of the victim’s consent may to some 
extent be objectively substantiated, either by the victim’s physical condition 
prior to the homicide or by the fact that the victim was the agent of her own 
destruction.”279  By turning the court’s focus to the objective fact of the 
donor’s physical condition prior to death, Professor Sherman’s mercy killing 
exception removes from the court’s purview the potentially broad and 
contradictory set of evidence that could bear on the issue of the donor’s 
subjective intent.280  In doing so, Professor Sherman steers probate courts to 
questions that they can more easily and more accurately answer. 
Although the objective nature of Professor Sherman’s mercy killing 
exception should provide policymakers some assurance that such a default 
slayer rule would increase social welfare, his proposal does raise one concern 
that Louisiana’s default slayer rule does not.  In particular, there might be 
questions regarding the link between the objective issue of the donor’s 
condition prior to the killing and the subjective issue of the donor’s intent to 
benefit their killer.  Whereas there is a clear connection between a donor’s 
forgiveness of their killer and their intent that their killer inherit, it is not as 
clear that a donor who is suffering from an incurable terminal illness or is 
permanently incapacitated would want their killer to inherit.  It is reasonable 
to assume that some, if not most, donors in these situations would want their 
killers to inherit but not necessarily all.  Professor Sherman’s mercy killing 
exception, therefore, might result in a probate court correctly determining 
that the donor’s death was the result of a mercy killing, while at the same 
time incorrectly determining that the donor intended their killer to inherit.  
This possibility for incorrect determinations of the donor’s intent to opt out 
of the slayer rule raises concerns that a mercy killing exception might not 
increase social welfare. 
While Professor Sherman’s mercy killing exception raises some 
uncertainty regarding whether it will increase social welfare, Wisconsin’s 
second approach to the slayer rule almost certainly results in a net societal 
benefit.  As described above, Wisconsin allows a donor to opt out of the 
slayer rule by expressly stating their intent to do so in their will.281  If the 
court identifies an explicit statement in the donor’s will that the slayer rule 
should not apply, then there is little uncertainty regarding the donor’s intent, 
and as such, policymakers should have confidence that such a default slayer 
                                                                    
 279.  Sherman, supra note 156, at 865–66 (emphasis added). 
 280.  While Sherman’s proposal does not focus on the subjective intent of the donor to benefit 
their killer, it does turn the court’s attention to the subjective intent of the killer.  Specifically, the 
mercy killing exception would allow a killer to inherit only “if the killer proves . . . that he killed 
the decedent with the intention of relieving the decedent’s suffering.”  Id. at 875 (emphasis added).  
This aspect of the mercy killing exception could raise concerns regarding the court’s ability to 
accurately and efficiently determine the killer’s motive. 
 281.  See WIS. STAT. § 854.14(6)(b) (2018).  
  
372 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 79:325 
rule will produce accurate outcomes.282  Moreover, from an efficiency 
standpoint, there is little concern that an express statement exception to the 
slayer rule will generate significant decision costs because the court is not 
authorized to consider extrinsic evidence of the donor’s intent.  Either the 
will contains a provision that expressly opts out of the slayer rule, or it does 
not.283  Litigation rates regarding the donor’s intent would therefore likely 
not increase under this type of default slayer rule.284 
Because an express statement exception to the slayer rule would result 
in more accurate determinations of the donor’s intent while not significantly 
increasing the costs of identifying that intent, policymakers around the 
country should follow the lead of their Wisconsin counterparts and transform 
the traditional mandatory slayer rule into a default rule from which the donor 
can expressly opt out.  Allowing a donor to expressly opt out of the slayer 
rule’s application through a testamentary provision would facilitate the 
exercise of freedom of disposition and increase social welfare.  However, 
whether policymakers should adopt Professor Sherman’s mercy killing 
exception or Wisconsin’s alternative approach that allows the court to 
consider extrinsic evidence of the donor’s intent is unclear because difficult 
theoretical and empirical questions remain regarding the accuracy and 
efficiency of such approaches. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Although the law grants donees broad freedom to accept or reject 
inheritances,285 it restricts this freedom in various ways.  Indeed, the law 
restrains the donee’s ability to reject a gift under some scenarios,286 and it 
restrains their ability to accept a gift under others.287  A social welfare 
analysis suggests that these restraints, whether of rejection or acceptance, are 
                                                                    
 282.  This is the rationale for the law’s general directive that courts should identify the testator’s 
intent by attributing the plain meaning to a will’s words.  See Tinnin v. First United Bank of Miss., 
502 So. 2d 659, 663 (Miss. 1987) (“The surest guide to testamentary intent is the wording employed 
by the maker of the will.”); Champine, supra note 25, at 401 (explaining that the plain meaning rule 
“offers predictability to all testators, assuring them that their wishes, if expressed unambiguously, 
will be respected”). 
 283.  In some situations, a provision in a will might be ambiguous regarding whether the testator 
intended to opt out of the slayer rule.  If policymakers consider this to be a legitimate concern, the 
law could require the testator to expressly reference the statutory provision authorizing them to opt 
out of the slayer rule’s application.  Indeed, this is the approach authorized in Wisconsin.  See WIS. 
STAT. § 854.14(6)(b). 
 284.  While there might not be significant increases in litigation rates regarding the meaning of 
the testator’s expressed intent, there might be concern that a default slayer rule would increase 
claims of fraud, duress, and undue influence.  This concern might be particularly acute if the testator 
executes their will very close to death.  See Mark Glover, The Timing of Testation, 107 KY. L.J. 
221, 244–48 (2019); Hirsch, supra note 129, at 845. 
 285.  See supra Section I.B. 
 286.  See supra Section II.A.2. 
 287.  See supra Section II.A.1. 
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primarily founded upon the concern that the donee’s exercise of freedom of 
inheritance will impose costs on others that the donee likely does not take 
into account when making their decision to accept or reject a gift.288  In these 
situations, the donee’s exercise of freedom of inheritance might not be 
socially beneficial, and, consequently, the law restricts the donee’s decision-
making capacity. 
Furthermore, a comparative analysis of the law’s two types of live hand 
restraints reveals that the law’s restraints of rejection are narrowly tailored to 
minimize negative externalities, while keeping the donee’s freedom of 
inheritance largely intact.289  By contrast, the law’s primary restraint of 
acceptance, namely the slayer rule, is overly broad and restricts the donee’s 
freedom of inheritance even in situations that do not raise externality 
concerns.290  Based on this analysis, reform of the slayer rule is needed in 
order to harmonize the law’s restraints of live hand control and to ensure that 
social welfare is maximized through the disposition of property upon 
death.291 
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